Date: Thu 13 Aug, 2026
Indian Potash Limited (IPL) operates as one of India's largest fertiliser importers and distributors, with its core business centered on sourcing and marketing Muriate of Potash, Di-Ammonium Phosphate, Sulphate of Potash, and Urea across the country - including remote and inaccessible regions - through an extensive network of Regional offices covering nearly every State capital. Its distribution model leans heavily on India's agricultural cooperative structure and direct farmer engagement, backed by nationwide farmer education initiatives, product literacy campaigns, and sales outreach programs run in multiple regional languages. Beyond its fertiliser trading and distribution mandate, IPL has diversified into allied agri and consumer businesses, including manufacturing of Cattle feed products, Milk and milk products, Sulphitation and refined Sugar, Distillery operations, and trading in Gold and other precious metals - giving the company a multi-segment revenue base anchored around, but not limited to, its position in India's fertiliser supply chain. The Company, incorporated and headquartered in Chennai, Tamil Nadu, also plays a quasi-strategic role in the sector given its past mandate for global tender-based procurement of key fertilisers on behalf of the industry, reflecting close alignment with government food-security and farmer-welfare objectives.
Particulars | FY26 | FY25 | YoY Change |
Revenue (Total Income) | 32,949 | 20,912 | 57.6% |
EBITDA | 1,964 | 1,305 | 50.5% |
EBITDA Margin | 0.06 | 0.06 | -0.3% |
Net Profit (NP) | 1,981 | 1,661 | 19.3% |
NP Margin (NPM) | 0.06 | 0.08 | -1.9% |
EPS (Basic & Diluted, Rs) | 693 | 581 | 19.3% |
Revenue surged ~57.6% YoY, driven largely by the trading (purchases of stock-in-trade) line rather than in-house manufacturing. Operating EBITDA grew more slowly at ~50.5%, and margin actually compressed slightly, as finance costs rose sharply alongside a much larger trading book. Consolidated net profit grew a more modest ~19.3%, diluting the consolidated margin even as absolute profit rose. EPS growth mirrors NP growth since the share count was unchanged.
Particulars | FY25 (Rs Cr) | FY25 (% of Rev) | FY26 (Rs Cr) | FY26 (% of Rev) |
Revenue (Total Income) | 20,912 | 100% | 32,949 | 100% |
Cost of Materials Consumed | 1,414 | 7% | 1,872 | 6% |
Purchases of Stock-in-Trade | 16,855 | 81% | 25,246 | 77% |
Changes in Inventories (WIP, Stock-in-Trade & FG) | (851) | -4% | 875 | 3% |
Total Cost of Goods Sold | 17,418 | 83% | 27,992 | 85% |
Employee Benefit Expense | 132 | 1% | 146 | 0% |
Finance Costs | 499 | 2% | 1,177 | 4% |
Depreciation & Amortisation | 68 | 0.3% | 126 | 0.4% |
Other Expenses | 2,057 | 10% | 2,847 | 9% |
Total Expenses | 20,174.32 | 96% | 32,288 | 98% |
Cost of goods sold (materials consumed + trading purchases, net of inventory movement) rose from ~83.3% to ~85.0% of revenue - the trading business scaled with a slightly thinner gross spread, largely because the mix shifted further toward lower-margin purchases of stock-in-trade (fertiliser trading) versus in-house materials consumption. Finance costs jumped from ~2.4% to ~3.6% of revenue, reflecting the much larger working-capital borrowings needed to fund the bigger trading book. Employee costs and other expenses improved slightly as a share of revenue, showing some operating cost leverage even as gross margin narrowed.
Particulars | FY26 (Rs Cr) | FY25 (Rs Cr) |
Property, Plant and Equipment | 1,859 | 1,542 |
Investments Accounted for Using Equity Method | 6,914 | 5,761 |
Inventories | 3,842 | 4,690 |
Trade Receivables | 8,246 | 4,507 |
Cash and Cash Equivalents | 2,644 | 367 |
Current Borrowings | 10,174 | 5,192 |
Non-Current Borrowings | 217 | 72 |
Trade Payables (Total) | 3,226 | 3,747 |
Total Equity | 13,663 | 11,321 |
Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | YoY Change |
Net Profit Margin | 6.01% | 7.94% | - |
Return on Equity (ROE) | 14.50% | 14.67% | - |
Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio | 17.72x | 13.56x | +4.16x |
Debt-to-Equity Ratio | 0.76x | 0.46x | +0.30x |

Date: Wed 12 Aug, 2026
Garuda Aerospace is an Indian drone technology company that designs, manufactures and operates drones across agriculture, defence, surveillance, infrastructure and industrial applications. Founded in 2015, the company has expanded from agricultural drone solutions into higher-value defence and industrial applications. It is also moving towards the public markets, having received SEBIโs final observation for its proposed IPO on 5 August 2026, bringing the company closer to a potential listing.
Garuda follows an integrated model covering drone manufacturing, Drone-as-a-Service (DaaS) and pilot training. It manufactures drones and also provides drone-based services to customers that do not want to own the equipment. Its applications range from agricultural spraying and mapping to defence surveillance, inspection and logistics.
Its portfolio has increasingly shifted beyond agriculture towards defence and industrial drones, including surveillance, swarm and cargo-delivery platforms.
Particulars | FY25 (โน lakh) | FY24 (โน lakh) |
Turnover | 11,767 | 10,994 |
Other Income | 712 | 81 |
Total Income | 12,480 | 11,076 |
Total Expenditure | 10,087 | 8,945 |
Profit Before Tax | 2,393 | 2,131 |
Profit After Tax | 1,726 | 1,582 |
Garuda Aerospace had confidentially filed for a proposed โน1,000 crore IPO in April 2026. The issue structure reported at the time consisted of a โน750 crore fresh issue and โน250 crore OFS. Following SEBI approval in August 2026, reports indicate the fresh issue component could be up to โน750 crore, with the final issue structure and price band to be announced later.
Object of the fresh issue:
Garuda has been accelerating its move into defence drones. In August 2025, it inaugurated a dedicated defence drone facility in Chennai and launched five new UAV platforms aimed at battlefield and disaster-response applications.
The company has also been increasing production capacity and R&D spending, with the June 2025 funding round intended to take annual production from around 8,000 drones to 12,000โ15,000 units and expand its international presence.
Garuda Aerospace is transitioning from an agriculture-focused drone company into a broader defence and industrial drone technology player. Its profitability, growing manufacturing capabilities and upcoming IPO provide a platform for expansion, while the increasing focus on defence applications could become an important growth driver going forward.
Date: Wed 12 Aug, 2026
For GalaxEye, Mission Drishti was supposed to be the moment when years of development translated into a working satellite in orbit. Instead, the Bengaluru-based space-tech startup lost communication with the spacecraft within weeks of its launch, leaving its core technology waiting for another chance to prove itself.
Founded in 2021 by five IIT Madras alumni, GalaxEye is developing OptoSAR, a satellite technology that combines optical imaging with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR).ย Optical cameras produce familiar, high-quality images but can be affected by clouds and darkness. SAR uses microwave signals and can operate through clouds and at night, although its imagery is more difficult to interpret.
GalaxEye's idea is to combine both technologies on the same satellite and fuse the resulting data. The company plans to use this capability for applications including defence, agriculture, infrastructure, insurance and disaster management.
On 3 May 2026, GalaxEye launched Mission Drishti aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9. The approximately 190-kg satellite represented a major milestone for the company and was designed to demonstrate its OptoSAR technology in orbit.ย However, during the satellite's early orbital phase, a severe geomagnetic solar storm affected the spacecraft.ย According to GalaxEye's initial root-cause analysis, radiation from the storm likely damaged a critical onboard subsystem. Communication with Drishti became intermittent and eventually stopped. On 7 July, the company said the chances of recovering the satellite were low.
The failure does not necessarily mean OptoSAR itself did not work. The bigger problem is that the mission ended before GalaxEye could fully demonstrate the technology and generate commercially useful imagery.
Rather than abandoning its approach, GalaxEye has moved to strengthen its spacecraft capabilities.ย On 10 August 2026, the company announced the acquisition of StarOps, a Bengaluru-based spacecraft engineering company with roots in TeamIndus.ย StarOps brings expertise in propulsion, avionics, flight computing, guidance and navigation, structures and mission operations. It has also developed satellite bus platforms in the 50 kg, 150 kg and 250 kg categories, with more than 66% indigenisation.
The acquisition is significant because the satellite's payload is only one part of the system. Power, communications, computing, navigation and thermal systems are equally important for keeping the payload operational.ย GalaxEye has said it plans to build two new OptoSAR satellites within 24 months.
GalaxEye has reportedly raised around โน212 crore since inception, while its latest funding rounds implied a valuation of approximately โน489 crore.ย The company also raised around โน93 crore during 2026, including a โน49.29 crore allotment in June.ย For investors, however, the important question is the price being paid today. The source notes that GalaxEye shares have reportedly traded in the unlisted market at around three times the latest primary valuation.ย That means investors are potentially paying a significant premium before the company's technology has been fully proven in orbit.
GalaxEye now faces a clear sequence of milestones: build the next satellite, successfully launch and commission it, demonstrate OptoSAR's capabilities and convert the resulting data into commercial contracts.ย The StarOps acquisition may strengthen the company's engineering capabilities, but it cannot eliminate execution risk.ย For GalaxEye, the next satellite will therefore be more than another mission. It will be the company's next opportunity to move from technological promise to technological proof.
Date: Tue 11 Aug, 2026
Madhur Iron and Steel is in the business of manufacturing and trading of a wide range of structural steel products, including Angles, Channels, Mild Steel (MS) Sections, and Flats & Rods. The Company primarily operates under a business-to-business (B2B), order-based model, supplying products to institutional customers. The Company is engaged in the manufacture of re-rolled structural steel products, including Angles, Channels and other similar products. Upon manufacture, such structural steel products are either sold directly to customers or, depending on customer specifications, further processed through fabrication to convert them into finished, application ready products. Its products cater to diverse end-use industries, such as railway electrification, state electricity boards, power and energy infrastructure, telecom tower manufacturing, automotive and ancillary units, offshore structure fabrication, construction and real estate, general engineering, auto body manufacturing, and other related industries.
Particulars | FY26 | FY25 | YoY Change |
Revenueย | 445 | 341 | 30.6% |
EBITDA | 53 | 39 | 36.7% |
EBITDA Margin | 11.9% | 11.4% | - |
Net Profit (NP) | 24 | 18 | 31.7% |
NP Margin (NPM) | 5.4% | 5.3% | - |
EPS (Basic & Diluted, Rs) | 8 | 7 | 19.5% |
Revenue grew 301% YoY, and EBITDA grew faster, pointing to modest operating leverage. Net profit rose 32%, slightly ahead of revenue growth, while EPS grew a slower 19% because the equity share capital base itself nearly doubled during the year. Company has issuedย 1,48,92,273 bonus shares in FY26.
Particulars | FY25 (Rs Cr) | FY25 (% of Rev) | FY26 (Rs Cr) | FY26 (% of Rev) |
Revenue (Total Income) | 341 | 100.0% | 445 | 100.0% |
Cost of Materials Consumed | 194 | 56.8% | 212 | 47.6% |
Purchases of Stock-in-Trade | 136 | 39.8% | 182 | 40.8% |
Changes in Inventories (FG & WIP) | (44) | -13.0% | (32) | -7.2% |
Total Cost of Goods Sold | 285 | 83.6% | 362 | 81.3% |
Employee Benefit Expense | 3 | 0.9% | 7 | 1.5% |
Finance Costs | 12 | 3.6% | 18 | 4.2% |
Depreciation & Amortisation | 2 | 0.5% | 2 | 0.5% |
Other Expenses | 14 | 4.1% | 24 | 5.3% |
Total Expenses | 316 | 92.7% | 413 | 92.7% |
Particulars | FY26 (โน Cr) | FY25 (โน Cr) |
Property, Plant and Equipment | 19 | 17 |
Inventories | 173 | 150 |
Trade Receivables | 80 | 42 |
Cash and Cash Equivalents | 0.22 | 0.70 |
Current Borrowings | 127 | 81 |
Non-Current Borrowings | 9 | 3 |
Trade Payables (Total) | 69 | 53 |
Total Equity | 117.90 | 93.99 |
Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | YoY Change |
Net Profit Margin | 5.4% | 5.3% | - |
Return on Equity (ROE) | 20.3% | 19.3% | - |
Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio | 24x | 20x | +4x |
Debt-to-Equity Ratio | 1.15x | 0.90x | +0.26x |
ROE improved as profit growth (32%) outpaced the 26% growth in the equity base from retained earnings and bonus issue. The Debt-to-Equity ratio rose as borrowings were drawn up faster than equity to fund working capital requirements.ย Fixed asset turnover improved, consistent with revenue growing faster than the property, plant and equipment base.

Date: Tue 11 Aug, 2026
Goodluck Defence and Aerospace Ltd. (GDAL), a subsidiary of Goodluck India Ltd., is expanding its presence in India's defence manufacturing sector. The company was established in 2023 and operates a facility in Sikandrabad, Uttar Pradesh, where it manufactures 155mm artillery shell bodies. Unlike complete ammunition manufacturers, GDAL focuses on the forged-steel shell body, while explosive filling and fuzes are handled separately. The company's facility has received the required defence manufacturing approvals and quality certification.
The business is benefiting from rising global demand for artillery ammunition following the Russia-Ukraine conflict and increased defence spending across several countries. GDAL currently has an annual capacity of around 1.5 lakh shells and plans to increase this to 4 lakh shells, supported by a planned expansion. The company has also secured a domestic order of around โน255 crore for 155mm long-range empty shells, strengthening visibility for the business.
GDAL generated โน46 crore of revenue and โน29 crore of EBITDA in FY26, translating into an EBITDA margin of around 63%. However, management has cautioned that this unusually high margin is not sustainable because the plant was operational for only part of the year. It expects a more normalised EBITDA margin of around 30โ35% as production scales up.
For FY27, management has guided for โน250โ300 crore of revenue from the defence business, with the existing capacity expected to operate at around 75โ80% utilisation. This would represent more than five times FY26 revenue at the lower end of the guidance. To support longer-term growth, GDAL's board on August 6, 2026, approved a proposal to raise โน283.5 crore through the issue of up to 75.6 lakh shares at โน375 each to 38 non-promoter investors. The proceeds will be used mainly for capacity expansion, working capital and general corporate purposes.
The company plans to invest around โน400 crore in expansion, taking annual shell-making capacity from 1.5 lakh to 4 lakh units. The fundraise therefore comes at a crucial stage as GDAL attempts to convert strong current demand into a much larger defence business.
Goodluck Defence is rapidly transforming Goodluck India's traditional engineering capabilities into a high-growth defence business. Strong artillery demand, a sizeable order pipeline and planned capacity expansion provide significant growth potential. However, the company still needs to prove that it can achieve its FY27 revenue guidance and sustain the targeted 30โ35% EBITDA margin as operations mature.
Date: Mon 10 Aug, 2026
Madhur Iron & Steel (India) Limited is preparing to enter the capital markets with its proposed Mainboard IPO. The company filed its Draft Red Herring Prospectus (DRHP) with SEBI on January 23, 2026, with the filing subsequently published by SEBI on February 6, 2026.ย The proposed IPO comprises a fresh issue of up to 1 crore equity shares, with no Offer for Sale component.
Company is engaged in the manufacturing and trading of a wide range of structural steel products, including Angles, Channels, Mild Steel (MS) Sections, and Flats & Rods. The Company primarily operates under a business-to-business (B2B), order-based model, supplying products to institutional customers. The Company is engaged in the manufacture of re-rolled structural steel products, including Angles, Channels and other similar products. Upon manufacture, such structural steel products are either sold directly to customers or, depending on customer specifications, further processed through fabrication to convert them into finished, application ready products. Its products cater to diverse end-use industries, such as railway electrification, state electricity boards, power and energy infrastructure, telecom tower manufacturing, automotive and ancillary units, offshore structure fabrication, construction and real estate, general engineering, auto body manufacturing, and other related industries.
KPI | Units | September 30, 2025 | March 31, 2025 | March 31, 2024 | March 31, 2023 |
Total Income | โน lakhs | 19,269 | 34,066 | 23,980 | 19,323 |
Revenue from Operations | โน lakhs | 19,224 | 33,956 | 23,925 | 19,284 |
Revenue from Operations Growth (YoY) | % | 42% | 42% | 24% | 57% |
EBITDA | โน lakhs | 2,016 | 3,511 | 2,409 | 1,387 |
EBITDA Margin | % | 10.5% | 10% | 10% | 7% |
Profit Before Tax (PBT) | โน lakhs | 1,329 | 2,480 | 1,733 | 928 |
PBT Margin | % | 7% | 7% | 7% | 5% |
Profit After Tax (PAT) | โน lakhs | 979 | 1,812 | 1,256 | 652 |
PAT Margin | % | 5% | 5% | 5% | 3.4% |
Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) | % | 312% | 357% | 375% | 338% |
Return on Equity (RoE) | % | 10% | 26% | 40% | 40% |
Return on Capital Employed (RoCE) | % | 8.5% | 17.7% | 21.6% | 23.6% |
Fixed Assets Turnover | Times | 8.80 | 19.04 | 16.50 | 19.44 |
EPS | โน | 3.28 | 6.71 | 5.38 | 2.80 |
Debt-Equity Ratio | Ratio | 0.98 | 0.90 | 1.35 | 1.55 |
KPI | Units | September 30, 2025 | March 31, 2025 | March 31, 2024 | March 31, 2023 |
Installed Capacity | Ton | 28,350 | 56,700 | 44,100 | 44,100 |
Capacity Utilised | Ton | 23,492 | 38,070 | 35,255 | 28,648 |
% Capacity Utilised | % | 83% | 67% | 80% | 65% |
Date: Mon 10 Aug, 2026
At the end of FY26, Transline had โน13 lakh in the bank, not โน13 crore! In the same fiscal year, it had made a profit after tax of โน70.28 crore on revenues of โน488.46 crore, registering a growth of 32%. Both the statements are correct, and both point to the reason why the company is planning an IPO.
Transline builds and runs security and identity infrastructure for institutions that can't afford failure - cameras, biometrics and AI for police stations, railways and smart cities, delivered as one accountable contract rather than four separate vendors. Incorporated in 2001, the company has spent 25 years working its way into some of the most sensitive corners of Indian public infrastructure: Aadhaar enrolment for UIDAI, biometric attendance systems for a state judiciary, and large-scale deployments across PSUs, Railways and Police departments, serving 250+ clients through 8+ proprietary platforms.
In the revenue profile, the truth comes out. The solutions business, which includes hardware and integration, accounts for 77% of the revenues but only 26% of the segment profit, at a meagre margin of 9.2%. While the services business contributes only 23% of the revenues, it accounts for 74% of the profits and is growingalmost twiceas fast.
This is a structural problem, not one of accounting trickery. In FY25 and FY26, the company has made a profit of โน118.6 crore while burning through โน87 crore in operational cash, resulting in a difference of โน200 crore. The amount of unbilled revenue, receivables, retention of money, and inventory has come toapproximately equala year's worth of sales at the top line. This has resulted in growth which has been external, via borrowings, capital raise in FY25, and now a DRHP approved by SEBI in January 2026.
At an indicative price of โน168 a share, the stock is trading at 21x FY26 earnings โnot unreasonable at 45% profit growth, but the market is paying for accounting profit without generating cash yet. If the company can bridge the gap in the form of billed and collected milestones or if the company is unable to bridge it via raising more capital, then we will know it from FY27 cash flow.
Metric | FY26 | FY25 |
Revenue | โน488.46cr | โน371.08cr |
Profit after tax | โน70.28cr | โน48.33cr |
Operating cash flow | โน (7.21)cr | โน (79.93)cr |
Trade receivables | โน218.07cr | โน189.59cr |
Contract assets (unbilled revenue) | โน145.51cr | โน90.64cr |
Inventories | โน66.53cr | โน29.70cr |
Cash & equivalents | โน0.13cr | โน0.13cr |
Date: Tue 04 Aug, 2026
Krasny Defence Technologies Ltd. (KDTL) is a niche defence engineering and lifecycle support company serving the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard, defence shipyards and Russian defence OEMs. Established in 1995, the company specializes in ship refits, repairs, lifecycle support, supply of defence spares, shipbuilding support and indigenous defence products under the Make in India initiative. Over three decades, KDTL has built strong customer relationships and technical expertise, enabling it to secure repeat defence contracts. CRISIL noted that the company reported revenue of โน107 crore in FY2025 and had an order book of โน712 crore as of September 2025, providing healthy medium-term revenue visibility.
KDTL follows an asset-light, engineering-led business model focused on providing lifecycle support and specialized engineering services rather than manufacturing defence platforms. The company undertakes naval ship refits, repairs, equipment overhaul, wiring, cabling, fabrication and supplies Russian-origin defence spares while also developing indigenous products under the Make in India initiative. It collaborates with Russian and Indian defence partners through strategic joint ventures, allowing it to leverage technology and customer access without significant capital investment. Its diversified offerings, niche product portfolio and long-standing relationships with defence customers have enabled the company to maintain healthy operating margins of around 20% while expanding into new business segments.
โ
Particulars | FY24 | FY25 | y-o-y growth |
Operating Revenue (โน Cr.) | 45 | 107 | 136.6% |
PAT (โน Cr.) | 6. | 15 | 129.9% |
PAT Margin | 15% | 14% | |
Operating Margin | 20% | 20% | |
Order Book (Sep-25) | โน712ย |
Ratios | FY24 | FY25 |
Adjusted Debt / Net Worth | 0.44x | 0.33x |
Interest Coverage | 20x | 31x |
PAT Margin | 14.8% | 14.4% |
Current Ratio | 4.63x |
Date: Mon 03 Aug, 2026
NSE's June 2026 quarter results dropped on July 30, 2026, and there's a lot more texture here than "profit up 7%." Let's unpack it properly.
Metric | Q1 FY27 (Jun'26) | Q1 FY26 (Jun'25) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
Revenue from operations | โน4,560 cr | โน4,032 cr | +13.1% |
Other income | โน692 cr | โน766 cr | -9.7% |
Total income | โน5,252 cr | โน4,798 cr | +9.5% |
Total expenses | โน1,172 cr | โน1,053 cr | +11.3% |
Profit before tax | โน4,169 cr | โน3,776 cr | +10.4% |
Net profit (total) | โน3,120 cr | โน2,924 cr | +6.7% |
EPS (basic & diluted) | โน12.6 | โน11.8 | +6.8% |
At first glance, a 6.7% profit growth on 13% revenue growth looks like margins are slipping. They're not โ the gap is almost entirely a base-effect quirk, which is worth explaining in any write-up so readers don't draw the wrong conclusion.
Last year's Q1 (June 2025) carried a โน112.04 crore one-off gain tucked into "discontinued operations" โ proceeds from NSE's education-business subsidiary (NAL Academy) selling its stake in TalentSprint. That gain inflated the year-ago base.
Strip out discontinued operations and compare the core, continuing business:
That 11% is the number that actually reflects how the core exchange business performed. The 6.7% headline is just an artifact of comparing against a quarter that had an unusual boost baked in.
Segment | Q1 FY27 | Q1 FY26 | Growth |
|---|---|---|---|
Trading | โน4,103 cr | โน3,639 cr | +12.8% |
Clearing | โน494 cr | โน453 cr | +9.0% |
Others (data, indices, licensing) | โน198 cr | โน149 cr | +32.5% |
Trading is still the dominant engine โ it's roughly 85% of segment revenue โ but the "Others" bucket (data feeds, data terminals, index licensing) is the fastest grower by a wide margin, even if it's small in absolute terms. That's a bucket worth watching over the next few quarters since it's the more diversified, less market-volume-dependent part of NSE's business.
Segment profit tells a similar story โ Trading segment result was โน2,960 cr vs โน2,599 cr, Clearing was โน317.4 cr vs โน303.4 cr, and Others jumped to โน106 cr vs โน71.1 cr (+49%), so profitability is actually growing faster than revenue in the smaller segments.
Total expenses rose 11.3% YoY, slightly faster than total income (9.5%) but slower than core operating revenue (13.1%). The main movers:
Nothing here looks like a red flag โ it's a business scaling its cost base roughly in line with growth, not overspending.
These sit below operating profit and are one-offs, so they don't reflect the ongoing business, but they explain some of the swing between PBT lines:
Together these added about โน68.6 cr to pre-tax profit, on top of the operating performance.
NSE's board approved paying โน714.7 crore to close out the Colocation and Dark Fibre cases with SEBI โ disputes that have been running since 2019, through SEBI's Whole-Time Member orders, Adjudicating Officer orders, SAT appeals, and Supreme Court proceedings. The total settlement is โน1,491.2 crore, of which NSE had already deposited โน776.5 crore earlier; this payment closes the gap.
Why this matters for anything investor-facing: NSE had already provisioned โน1,391.2 crore for this in FY26, so the P&L hit isn't sitting in this quarter โ the cash settlement is largely pre-funded. What it does do is remove a near-decade-old regulatory overhang right as NSE moves toward its IPO, which is likely to matter more to unlisted-market sentiment than the quarter's actual profit number.
The ~โน485 crore gap between standalone and consolidated comes from subsidiaries (NSE Clearing, NSE Indices, NSE Data & Analytics, etc.) and NSE's share of profit from associates like NSDL โ a reminder that a meaningful chunk of NSE's overall earnings power sits outside the parent entity, in the ecosystem it has built around itself.

Date: Fri 31 Jul, 2026
Zepto's road to the stock market just got a detour. The quick commerce company has decided to lay aside its IPO plans for the time being and is instead lining up a pre-IPO round of more than โน1,000 crore, according to reports citing people familiar with the matter.
The money is expected to come largely from names already on Zepto's cap table. Glade Brook Capital, General Catalyst, Goodwater Capital, and Nexus Venture Partners are all said to be in the mix. There's some disagreement in reports about whether this will be a purely domestic affair or include foreign investors too, but the broader picture is clear: this is existing money coming back in, not new investors being courted. SEBI rules allow companies to raise up to 20% of their proposed fresh issue this way, with whatever's raised getting adjusted against the IPO's fresh issue later.
So why the sudden change of plan? It really comes down to money, specifically how much Zepto is actually worth.
Institutional investors, mutual funds and insurers among them, have apparently been pushing back hard on valuation. Word is they're valuing the company somewhere between $2.5 and 3 billion, which is a pretty brutal haircut from where things stood just weeks earlier, when foreign institutional investors were reportedly working off a $4.5 billion pre-money number, pointing to something like $5.1 billion post-money.ย
Go back further and the gap looks even wider. Fund managers are said to be holding out for pricing 30-40% below Zepto's last valuation of $7 billion, set when the company raised $450 million back in October 2025. Part of the resistance, apparently, is that investors don't think Zepto should be priced in the same league as Swiggy or Eternal (Zomato's parent). Unlike those two, Zepto has no food delivery arm, it's quick commerce only, so the comparisonย doesn't quite hold up in their eyes.
None of this is entirely new territory for Zepto. The company first talked about going public back in 2025 but backed off when markets turned choppy and the valuation math got messy. Since then, it's done the groundwork you'd expect from a company serious about listing, moving its base from Singapore to India and building up its domestic shareholding, and had even gotten as far as receiving SEBI's observation letter on May 8.
For now though, that process is on ice. Zepto hasn't responded to questions about the fundraise, its valuation, or when, or if, the IPO timeline gets revived.

Date: Thu 30 Jul, 2026
India holds somewhere between โน50โ60 lakh crore of household wealth in gold. Weddings, festivals, emergencies โ for generations, that wealth has moved through jewellers, chits and hand-written ledgers, with almost no digital infrastructure behind it.
India Gold Metaverse (IGM) is trying to build that missing infrastructure. Despite the name, there's no VR headset involved โ it's four connected businesses:
Revenue is meant to come from commissions, trading spreads, vaulting fees, software licensing and gold-backed lending โ an ecosystem play, not a single product. The company is mentored by Jignesh Shah, founder of 63 Moons, a name with real weight in Indian exchange-building circles.
Then came the headline: โน300 crore raised, with marquee names attached โ Ashish Kacholia, along with the Jagdish Master, Waaree, Ravi Sheth and Anuj Sheth family offices, in a transaction run by Pantomath. For an unlisted company with sub-โน10 crore revenue, that's a very loud number. So it's worth checking against the paper trail.
What the filing actually shows
Every Indian company issuing new shares has to file Form PAS-3 with the Registrar of Companies โ and that filing doesn't do adjectives. IGM's PAS-3, for an allotment dated 2 May 2026, shows:
Particulars | Detail |
|---|---|
Shares allotted | 9,56,70,628 |
Nominal value | โน1 |
Premium | โน20 |
Issue price | โน21 per share |
Amount raised | โน200.91 crore |
Not โน300 crore. โน200.91 crore, at โน21 a share.
That's not a contradiction โ it's a timing gap, and there are two straightforward reasons for it. One, MCA filings run on their own clock. Large rounds are routinely allotted in tranches, each with its own PAS-3 filed weeks later. IGM has already expanded its authorised capital from โน108 crore to โน153 crore, well beyond what's been issued so far โ a sign it's making room for more allotments. Two, an announcement isn't a wire transfer. Round sizes get declared when terms are signed; the cash can follow over months. So the โน300 crore figure is very likely genuine โ it's just not yet fully verifiable, which is different from being untrue.
The number that actually deserves attention: price, not size
Three prices exist for the same stock, within weeks of each other:
Reference | Price per share |
|---|---|
Registered valuer's fair value (29 Mar 2026) | โน19.50 |
Price paid by anchor investors (May 2026 allotment) | โน21.00 |
Current indicative unlisted market price | โน25.00 |
Kacholia and the family offices came in at โน21. The unlisted market today is quoting โน25 โ a 19% premium over what the informed, anchor money paid, and a 28% premium over the independent valuer's fair value, in the space of a few weeks.
Sometimes that kind of premium is earned โ smart money moves early and the market re-rates around it. Sometimes it's simply the cost of arriving after the story has already been packaged and sold.
Running the scale math
If the full โน300 crore eventually lands at โน21, dilution rises to roughly 13.5% and post-money moves to about โน2,234 crore. Either way, the unlisted market is currently pricing in close to โน400 crore of value that no investor in this actual round paid for.
A two-and-a-half-year-old company, still building, with revenue that barely registers โ which is normal for infrastructure at this stage. It just means investors buying at โน25 in the unlisted market are paying a ~โน2,500 crore valuation for a plan, in a market with no daily price discovery and lot sizes as small as 5,000 shares.
The takeaway
There's a genuine thesis here: India's gold trade is fragmented, under-digitised, and enormous in scale, and the people backing IGM are far from naive. But in the unlisted market, the story almost always arrives before the paperwork โ and that gap is exactly where retail investors tend to get priced badly.
Three checks worth applying to any unlisted "mega-round" headline:
As of now, what's verifiable is โน200.91 crore, at โน21 per share, allotted 2 May 2026, on record with the MCA. The rest is announcement, not confirmation โ and if it shows up in a later filing, that's worth tracking, not assuming.
Date: Wed 29 Jul, 2026
At each scanning session for patients in an MRI machine, when a semiconductor wafer is being etched, and also at the drawing of optical fiber cables, helium at -269ยฐC is used to ensure that all machines work efficiently. India does not produce any commercial helium at all and all of it is imported. The fact is that commercial helium occurs only in a few places on the planet (for example, in Texas, Qatar, Algeria, and Canada). And it is five companies worldwide who monopolize 80% of total helium production. AirLife Gases Private Limited was founded by Kiran Karnawat, an industry veteran, to address the problem of India's dependence on helium supplies.
Key Pivot: Major Strategic M&A Moves
While AirLifeโs success has been driven by the business model of arbitrage on the basis of sourcing and logistics, its recent bold move in M&A has completely transformed the future of the business:
Within one year, AirLife has gone from being a middleman distributor to being fully vertically integrated as an upstream helium producer โ owning everything from the reservoir to the liquefaction and transport process.
The Truth Behind the Financials & Fundraising
The pivot of strategy at AirLife won it much praise, raising about โน143.5 crore between April and September 2025 at โน900 per share. The marquee backers involved were Ashish Kacholia (who wrote a โน15 crore check), Shiv Sehgal, and Neo Alternatives, giving it a post-money valuation of โน958 crore.ย On the post-money โน958 crore against FY25 PAT of โน12.5 crore, P/E is closer to 77x.
FY25 Revenue was โน183 crore (down 3% from โน188 crore in FY24), showing stagnation in the top line in recent years. The operating margin fell from 26.4% in FY23 (due to the global helium shortage) to 8.6% in FY24 (when Russian supply came back into Asian markets) before inching up to 10.9% in FY25 with โน12.5 crore PAT in FY25. At โน900 per share, AirLife is trading at around 65x FY25 P/E multiple and an EV/EBITDA multiple in the mid-40s. The valuation of this fundraise depends greatly on optimistic internal forecasts (revenue in FY26 at โน412 crore) and terminal multiples beyond FY30.
Conclusion
The demand for helium in India in the spheres of medicine, aerospace and technology has been growing, and its recent M&A activity solves the problem of molecule security by becoming a major supplier of the product. Nevertheless, entering upstream operations entails a great deal of execution, geological and recommissioning risks. The current market valuation of AirLife, at 65 times historical earnings, clearly speaks to the future rather than past success.
โ
Date: Wed 29 Jul, 2026
โA- One Steel India Ltd. was established in 2009 under the vision ofย Mr. Krishan Kumar Jallan. It is aย backwards-integrated steel manufacturing company in southern India with a diversified product portfolio in both long and flat steel products and industrial products used in steel manufacturing.ย The company has a total installed capacity of 1.497 million metric tonnes per annum. The company isย one of the top 5 (five) steel producers in southern India in terms of crude steel capacity.
A-One Steelย have six manufacturing facilities of which five are located in Karnataka and one in Andhra Pradesh. Company's manufacturing facilities are located at Gauribidanur, Bellary, Koppal, and Chikkantapur in Karnataka and Hindupur in Andhra Pradesh.
A- One Steel India has published its performance for the financial year 2026.FY26 was a strong turnaround year for the company: revenue grew ~17.7% to โน4,202 Cr, while EBITDA and net profit grew far faster (+70% and over 11x, respectively), driving a marked improvement in margins and return ratios.ย โ
Particulars | FY26 | FY25 | YoY change |
Total Revenue | 4,202 | 3,569 | +17.7% |
EBITDA | 339 | 199 | +70% |
EBITDA Margin | 8% | 5.6% | +2.5 pp |
Net Profitย | 125 | 10 | +1,104% |
NP Margin | 2.99% | 0.29% | +2.7 pp |
EPS | 18 | 1.58 | +1,053% |
Revenue grew a healthy 17.7%, but the real story is operating leverage - EBITDA grew nearly 4x faster than revenue (+70%), lifting margin by 2.5 pp. This flowed through to the bottom line, with net profit rising over 11x, aided by FY25's one-off fire-damage loss not repeating and finance costs holding flat despite a larger balance sheet.
Particulars | FY25 (โนCr) | FY25 (% revenue) | FY26 (โนCr) | FY26 (%revenue) |
Total Revenue | 3,569 | 100% | 4,202 | 100% |
Cost of materials consumed | 3,054 | 85.5% | 3,487 | 82.9% |
Employee benefit expense | 48 | 1.37% | 53 | 1.26% |
Finance costs | 111 | 3.1% | 111 | 2.64% |
Depreciation & amortisation | 56 | 1.57% | 62 | 1.49% |
Material cost fell around 2.6 pp as a share of revenue, the single biggest driver of the EBITDA margin expansion. Finance cost also eased by 0.5 pp despite a larger balance sheet, while employee cost and depreciation remained broadly stable as a proportion of revenue.
Particulars | FY26 | FY25 |
Property, plant and equipment | 633 | 569 |
Inventories | 899 | 797 |
Trade receivables | 664 | 437 |
Cash and cash equivalents | 25 | 11 |
Current borrowings | 674 | 680 |
Non-current borrowings | 336 | 282 |
Trade payablesย | 965 | 765 |
.
Trade receivables grew by 52%, far outpacing revenue growth (18%) - suggesting that though revenue and profits have expanded significantly in FY26 but the company faces difficulty in collecting cash. However, trade payables also grew 26%, indicating part of the receivables build-up was funded by stretching suppliers rather than drawing on working capital lines.
Particulars | FY26 | FY25 | YoY change |
Net Profit Margin | 2.99% | 0.29% | +2.70 pp |
Return on Equityย | 14.5% | 1.45% | +13.11 pp |
Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio | 6.6x | 6.2x | +0.36x |
Debt-to-Equity Ratio | 1.17x | 1.34x | -0.17x |
ROE's sharp jump is largely a low-base effect from a weak FY25. The Debt-to-Equity ratio actually improved (fell 0.17x) even as the balance sheet grew; the growth was funded more by retained earnings than fresh debt. Fixed asset turnover rose only modestly, consistent with FY26's profit growth being margin-led rather than driven by significantly better asset utilisation.

Date: Mon 27 Jul, 2026
Versuni India: FY26 Financial & Operational Performance Analysis
Financial Performance (FY26 Numbers & Projections):ย Versuni India brought in revenue from operations of โน2,173.11 crore in FY26, marking a solid 15.5% jump from โน1,880.85 crore the previous year, with total income landing at โน2,185.29 crore. EBITDA climbed 34.4% to โน271.62 crore compared to โน202.10 crore, pushing gross margins up to 43.5% from 40.3%. Profit Before Tax went up by 38.8% to โน231.39 crore, while Profit After Tax followed closely with a 38.7% rise to reach โน172.63 crore from โน124.48 crore. That pushed the net profit margin to 7.90% and delivered an EPS of โน30.01. A big chunk of this bottom line growth came down to a smart operational shift: cutting back on imported finished goods to build things locally at their Ahmedabad and Chennai facilities, alongside collecting cash from customers 20% faster. If you are looking at valuations with the share price sitting at โน750, the stock trades at 25.0x reported FY26 earnings, or around 30.2x if you normalize those margins.
Operational Metrics:ย The business handles manufacturing and sales for small home appliances under the licensed Philips brand and their own Preethi brand, driven by a tight team of 1,353 employees. The public float is pretty tight at just 3.87%, leaving the Dutch parent company, Versuni Holding B.V., firmly in control with a 96.13% stake. Looking at the balance sheet, they are entirely debt-free and sitting comfortably on โน410.43 crore in cash and deposits against a total equity base of โน440.79 crore. Capital efficiency improved nicely as well, with Return on Equity moving from 36% to 43% and Return on Capital Employed ticking up from 39% to 44%. Reported operating cash flow shot up to โน468.58 crore, though it is worth noting that more than half of that came from working capital adjustments, specifically a massive drop in traded goods inventory and stretched supplier payments.
Key Project Executions & Order Book:ย The big story on the ground this year was the deliberate pivot away from buying finished traded goods, which dropped 38.8%, in favor of ramping up raw material consumption by 93.2% to manufacture products locally across a combined 25,000 square metres of plant space. Product rollouts got a strong push across categories, highlighted by the Philips Airfryer seeing a 77% year-over-year surge, alongside the Preethi Zodiac and the newly launched OneChef appliance packing 33 functions. To keep their leadership secure in irons and air purifiers, they pushed ad spending up by 16.5% to โน252.10 crore, which works out to 11.6% of revenue, while also rolling out a fresh ESOP scheme covering over 1.15 million options to keep key talent aligned.
Strategic Developments & Outlook:ย Moving forward, Versuni's playbook relies on capturing the remaining cost savings from local sourcing, with about 20% of their COGS import base still left to transition, giving them a realistic runway of another 200 to 300 bps in gross margin expansion. Even so, that eye-catching 38.7% profit spike is a one-time structural reset that is unlikely to repeat itself. On the flip side, you have to keep an eye on some genuine headwinds, including heavy related-party outflows of โน164.23 crore heading back to the parent group via dividends, IT charges, and a 73% surge in Philips brand royalties. Toss in mounting E-waste liabilities, customer concentration where a single buyer accounts for 20% of revenue, and an upcoming Offer for Sale as the promoters look to offload a slice of that massive 96.1% holding, and you have got plenty to weigh against that valuation.

Date: Mon 27 Jul, 2026
Financial Performance (FY26 Numbers & Projections):
Total revenues from operations for Elofic Industries Limited in FY26 were โน459.6 crore, showing only a slight rise of 2.1% from โน450.1 crore in FY25. Total income was โน487.0 crore. This was aided by a sharp increase in Other Income, which went up to โน27.4 crore, from โน11.5 crore in FY25 due to treasury and forex gains. EBITDA decreased by 19.7% to โน89.7 crore from โน111.7 crore. This led to a margin decrease of 5.3 percentage points to 19.5% from 24.8%. This decrease in operating margins was due to an increase in cost of raw materials from 43.3% to 46.4% of revenues and an increase in employee benefits expense to 15.6% of revenues from 13.6%. PBT dropped by 10.4% to โน96.5 crore, but PAT remained nearly flat at โน76.0 crore, down by 1.6% from โน77.3 crore in the previous year. PAT margin was thus 16.5%. Bottom-line performance benefited from non-operating treasury gains and the reduction in the effective tax rate to 21.2%, from 28.3% in FY25. Looking ahead, management has announced a public target for growth to โน700 crore in annual sales by FY28.
Operational Metrics:
Elofic is a 75-year-old producer of filters that generates about 85 million filters annually via six production units situated in Faridabad, Nalagarh, and Hosur. The sales of Elofic Company are made via three different channels: OEMs, domestic aftermarket, and export sales. The share of exports is equal to 45% and involves supplying US OEMs with the help of domestic US warehouses. The company's domestic operations comprise a huge network of more than 1,400 distributors and 55,000 dealers. In terms of financial position, Elofic has increased its total assets by 23% to โน473.6 crore in FY26, where the increase was made via equity financing only without any increase in long-term debt. The total debt of the company is equal to about โน3.1 crore in lease liabilities, leading to Debt-to-Equity ratio of approximately 0.01x. Due to efficient working capital management and quick payments of customers, trade receivables have decreased from โน84.8 crore to โน68.3 crore, contributing to cash and equivalents of โน62.1 crore, which is 16 times higher than โน3.8 crore in FY25.
Key Project Executions & Order Book:
Elofic is engaged in large domestic as well as foreign OEM associations with various automakers and engine makers like Tata Motors, Royal Enfield, General Motors, Maruti Suzuki, Kohler, and Action Construction Equipment (ACE). There has been a 69% growth in operating cash flows in comparison to the previous fiscal year, amounting to โน78.2 crore as compared to โน46.3 crore in FY25. The management has used this cash flow for setting records of capex spending, where FY26 capex amount is โน119.3 crore, almost seven times higher than โน17.5 crore in FY25.
Strategic Developments & Outlook:
The technological differentiation and premiumization strategy of Elofic is a long-term one in order to overcome the issue of pricing competition in the aftermarket sector. Elofic has an exclusive R&D center accredited by DSIR that owns nine patents and eleven patents are under application. In order to overcome the issue of fluctuation in prices of raw materials and margins in the domestic market, Elofic is utilizing its growing international network. The present stage of capex cycle of Elofic makes it poised for the future filtration demand from automotive, tractor, industrial, and transport sectors.

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