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25 Sep 2026
5 Min Read
Greenzo Energy Unlisted Shares: Renewable Sector Guide
Greenzo Energy India Ltd is a small green hydrogen equipment company whose unlisted shares are traded on the pre-IPO market.
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17 Sep 2026
29 Min Read
Mohan Meakin Limited - FY26 Results
Mohan Meakin Limited, established in 1855, headquartered at Mohan Nagar, Ghaziabad, is among India's earliest alcoholic beverage companies and manufacturer of Old Monk, which is considered the world's best selling dark rum. This company currently has four operational production units, including Solan Brewery (Himachal Pradesh), Kasauli Distillery, Bhankarpur (Punjab), and Mohan Nagar (Uttar Pradesh). Apart from this, it is also involved in the small-scale business of producing non-alcoholic foods and beverages, which include juices, cornflakes, wheat porridge, and vinegar. Since the liquor policies in India are controlled by state governments, Mohan Meakin relies to a large extent on licensed third parties for bottling its product. Shares of this company are listed on the Calcutta Stock Exchange, where there were no transactions during the year, and hence the pricing of shares is done in the grey market.This report contains an analysis of the financial performance of Mohan Meakin Limited for the year ended March 31, 2026 vis-à-vis March 31, 2025. The year 2026 turned out to be a profitable one for the company with revenue from operations growing by a marginal 7.0% to ₹2,302 Cr while profit after tax increasing much faster at 52.7% to ₹157 Cr, driven by a massive swing in the excise duty expense line and a continuing shift in the revenue mix towards the sale of products in which the company did not invest in assets. This resulted in a substantial improvement in both the EBITDA margin (+2.6 pp) and the net profit margin (+2.0 pp). One interesting aspect about the company’s balance sheet is that it had almost no borrowings of ₹4.3 Cr against ₹398 Cr of cash, deposits and investments and was funded mainly by internal accruals.1. Revenue, EBITDA, Net Profit & EPS Summary (₹ in Cr)ParticularsFY26FY25Y-o-Y changeRevenue from Operations2,3022,151+7.0%EBITDA (pre-exceptional)219149+47.0%EBITDA Margin9.5%6.9%+2.6 ppProfit Before Tax209138+51.4%Net Profit (PAT)157103+52.7%NP Margin (NPM)6.8%4.8%+2.0 EPS (₹)184.2120.6+52.7%
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16 Sep 2026
10 Min Read
Apollo Green Energy Unlisted Share Price, Financials & Growth Outlook
AGEL has shifted its focus in terms of core operations from their traditional trading business to utility solar EPC, BESS (battery energy storage system), green hydrogen projects, and transmission lines.
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15 Sep 2026
10 Min Read
ASK Investment Managers: The FY26 Profit Crash, Decoded
India is minting rich people faster than almost anywhere else in the world. The number of Indians with over $30 million in net worth has jumped sharply in the last five years, and India now has over 200 billionaires — third-highest in the world. Deloitte expects professionally managed wealth in India to roughly double by FY29.So here is the puzzle. ASK Investment Managers — one of India's oldest wealth management houses, majority-owned by Blackstone — just closed FY26 with profit after tax collapsing from ₹444 crore to ₹97 crore, a 78% fall. EPS dropped from ₹51.86 to ₹11.67.In the middle of a boom. What happened? We went through ASK's audited FY26 annual report line by line to find out.First, what does ASK actually do?Founded in 1983, ASK holds one of India's earliest discretionary PMS licences (1994). Today it runs ₹77,530 crore in AUM across four distinct businesses — each earning money in a very different way.1. Asset Management — ₹15,446 crore AUM. The original ASK business. It runs listed-equity PMS and AIF strategies for wealthy individuals and family offices, with the flagship Indian Entrepreneur Portfolio. ASK earns a management fee plus a performance fee here. Because ASK manufactures the product itself, this is by far its highest-margin rupee.2. Private Wealth — ₹54,891 crore AUM. ASK's biggest business by size — advisory to 4,300+ HNI/UHNI families through 156 relationship managers. But roughly 74% of this AUM sits in someone else's products (third-party mutual funds, bonds, other AIFs). ASK earns distribution and advisory fees here — far thinner margins than manufacturing.3. Alternates — ₹7,193 crore AUM. Three sub-businesses: a real-estate structured credit fund, a long-short hedge solutions platform, and a newly launched private credit business (Fund I closed at ₹540 crore). These earn fees on committed capital plus performance carry.4. ASK Finance — a small NBFC lending arm earning interest income.Here's the mismatch that explains the entire year: Private Wealth holds 71% of ASK's AUM but contributes only ~18% of fee revenue. Asset Management holds 20% of AUM but drives ~75% of fee revenue.FY26 vs FY25 — the numbers (Consolidated, ₹ crore)MetricFY26FY25ChangeRevenue from operations8691,038−18%Total income9081,112−18%Employee benefits expense371275+35%Finance costs95+79%Depreciation & amortisation2616+56%Other expenses332387−14%Total expenses737683+8%Profit before exceptional items & tax171429−60%Exceptional items7——Profit before tax164429−62%Tax expense67(14) credit—PAT (before minority interest)97444−78%PAT attributable to owners102446−77%Basic EPS (₹)11.6751.86−77%Net worth1,7141,813−5%Revenue fell 18%. Costs rose 8%. That gap is the whole story — but it's driven by four separate things happening at once.Revenue mix — where the ₹169 crore actually went missingRevenue line (₹ crore)FY26FY25Asset management, advisory & other fees649770Financial product distribution & wealth advisory fees156149Fund-based revenue (NBFC)87101Net gain/(loss) on fair value changes(23)18Sponsor contribution(21)20Others(2)(2)Total revenue from operations8691,038Asset management fees alone fell ₹121 crore — that's ASK's highest-margin revenue line, and it accounts for most of the damage. Meanwhile Private Wealth — the part of the business actually riding the industry's growth — grew AUM by ~₹5,800 crore and added 700+ new families, but moved the revenue needle by barely ₹7 crore. A rupee parked in a third-party fund earns a fraction of what a rupee in ASK's own PMS earns.Four reasons behind the fall1. The most profitable machine had a bad year. The Nifty fell ~5% in FY26. PMS/AIF gross inflows collapsed 55% YoY while redemptions rose. Performance fees, which only trigger above a hurdle, dried up.2. ASK's own money lost money. The company holds ~₹1,290 crore of investments on its own balance sheet — largely sponsor commitments required by regulation, plus treasury. "Net gain on fair value changes" swung from +₹18 cr to −₹23 cr, and "Sponsor contribution" swung from +₹20 cr to −₹21 cr — an ₹82 crore negative swing that has nothing to do with client business and everything to do with market moves.3. Deliberate, aggressive spending. Headcount rose from ~500 to 624. ASK hired a new CEO-Equities, a CIO, a Deputy CIO, and a Head of Sales & Distribution; relationship managers rose from 115 to 156. Employee cost jumped from ₹275 crore to ₹371 crore — ₹96 crore of extra salary in the same year revenue fell. On top of the existing business, ASK also funded four brand-new ventures: a mutual fund platform, a DIFC (Dubai) wealth office, a private credit franchise, and a non-discretionary equity advisory desk. Management's own disclosed bridge attributes roughly ₹106 crore of the profit decline to these new, not-yet-profitable initiatives.4. The FY25 base was flattered. In FY25, ASK booked a one-time ₹119.5 crore tax provision reversal (an income-tax refund related to ESOP perquisite deductions), which turned its tax line into a net credit of ₹14 crore — pushing FY25 PAT above its own PBT. Strip that one-off out, and FY25's "real" PAT was closer to ₹325 crore. On that basis, the fall is a still-brutal 70%, not 78% — the headline comparison was never quite apples-to-apples.One more detail: despite the profit collapse, ASK paid out ₹26 per share in interim dividends (~₹227 crore) — more than twice the year's profit — which is why net worth fell from ₹1,813 crore to ₹1,714 crore even though the company stayed profitable.Two different "profits" in the same reportIf you only read ASK's cover page, you'd see ₹277 crore PBT and ₹207 crore PAT — not the ₹171 crore / ₹97 crore in the audited numbers above. Neither is wrong; they answer different questions.Audited profit — what the auditors signed off on. Every rupee earned, minus every rupee spent, minus actual tax paid. This is the legal, real number: ₹171 crore PBT (before exceptionals), ₹97 crore PAT."Matured business" profit — management's own adjusted view, which adds back the losses from the four new initiatives (₹45 crore in asset management, ₹61 crore in wealth — ₹106 crore total) to show what the established business alone earned.₹ croreAudited profit before exceptional items & tax171Add back: losses from new initiatives+106= "Matured business" PBT277Less: exceptional items7Audited PBT164The ₹207 crore "matured PAT" is calculated by applying a hypothetical 25.168% tax rate to the ₹277 crore — it isn't ASK's actual tax bill. The real tax paid was ₹67 crore, and the real PAT was ₹97 crore.Is this misleading? Not necessarily — management's argument is fair: "our core engine earns ₹277 crore; we chose to spend ₹106 crore seeding four new businesses." That's genuinely useful context for a company investing in growth, and ASK does disclose the full bridge rather than hiding it. But three things are worth holding onto: the ₹106 crore is real money that left the bank account; "new initiative" is management's own label, not an audited category; and this framing can, in principle, run for years if the new businesses stay loss-making.How does ASK compare with listed peers?ASK isn't listed — Blackstone owns ~71%, bought in 2022 at roughly $1 billion (~₹7,700 crore). The rest trades on India's unlisted/pre-IPO market. Here's how FY26 stacks up against comparable listed wealth managers (figures independently verified from each company's own FY26 results filings):MetricASK Investment Managers360 ONE WAMAnand Rathi WealthListing statusUnlistedNSE/BSE listedNSE/BSE listedFY26 PAT₹97 cr (−78% YoY)₹1,225 cr (+21% YoY)~₹397 cr (+32% YoY)FY26 AUM₹77,530 cr~₹6.7 lakh cr₹93,037 crApprox. P/E~68x (on reported PAT) / ~33x (on "matured" PAT)~38x trailing~74x trailingApprox. Price/Book~4x~4.8x—Both listed peers grew profit sharply in the same year ASK's fell — a reminder that ASK's FY26 dip is company-specific (its revenue mix and deliberate spending), not an industry-wide problem. On reported earnings, ASK looks expensive relative to 360 ONE WAM; against Anand Rathi Wealth's rich multiple, it's actually cheaper. On book value, all three sit in a broadly similar band.As of late August 2026, ASK's unlisted shares were quoted around ₹785–820, down 35–45% from a 52-week high of ₹1,275–1,485 — the market has already marked this down. With ~8.75 crore shares outstanding, that implies a market cap of roughly ₹6,900 crore. Strip out the ~₹1,290 crore of non-operating investments sitting on the balance sheet, and buyers are effectively paying ~₹5,600 crore for the actual fee-earning business.What could change the story from hereThe mutual fund launch. SEBI's final approval came through in FY26, with schemes going live from August 2026. ASK's PMS minimum ticket is ₹50 lakh, which locks out most of India's wealth — a mutual fund opens the door to everyone and lets ASK "catch" clients early. India's MF industry recently crossed ₹81.5 lakh crore in AUM, growing ~21% — but ASK will be a late entrant (~45th) into an increasingly price-competitive space, especially after SEBI's TER rationalisation.Wealth build-out continuing. RMs are targeted to grow from 156 to 200+ by FY27. A new sub-UHNI segment has already added ~₹1,700 crore; the DIFC Dubai office has pulled in ₹556 crore chasing NRI money; a non-discretionary advisory desk added ₹354 crore in its first year.Alternates scaling. Private credit Fund II got SEBI approval and launched in FY27; the real-estate fund's newest vehicle raised ₹1,350 crore — its largest ever. Alternates fees are stickier than wealth-distribution fees because they're tied to locked-in committed capital plus carry.Operating leverage in reverse. The ₹96 crore of extra salary is already spent and headcount is already in place. If markets recover and revenue comes back, a large share of it should drop straight to the bottom line — but that only works if revenue actually returns.And the elephant in the room: Blackstone typically holds portfolio companies for 4–7 years, and it bought ASK in 2022 — which puts a possible listing or strategic sale somewhere in the 2026–2029 window. Nothing has been announced, but it's a large part of why anyone holds this stock today.Bottom lineASK's FY26 is a useful case study in something people often get wrong about wealth management: AUM growth and profit growth are not the same thing. India's wealth boom is real and shows up clearly in ASK's Private Wealth AUM. But ASK's profits come mainly from manufacturing equity products — a business that is hostage to the Nifty, to gross inflows, and to performance fees that only exist above a hurdle. When markets wobbled, the profit engine stalled, while the boom-facing wealth business added revenue too thin to plug the gap. On top of that, management chose to spend over ₹100 crore building four new businesses into the downturn rather than protect the printed profit number.Whether that turns out to be good judgement will depend entirely on whether the mutual fund, the private credit franchise, and the Dubai office are earning real money three years from now. FY26 was the year ASK paid for its ambition. FY27 onwards is when we find out what it bought.
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15 Sep 2026
4 Min Read
GKN Driveline India - FY26 Results
IntroductionGKN Driveline (India) Limited, incorporated in 1985 and headquartered in Faridabad, Haryana, is an automotive components manufacturer and part of GKN Automotive, the global driveline technology and systems business now operating under the UK-based Dowlais Group (demerged from the former GKN plc / Melrose Industries in 2023). GKN Driveline International holds a majority stake in the Indian entity. The company manufactures constant velocity joints, propshafts and connecting shafts, and drive axle assemblies for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles, supplying original equipment manufacturers both in India and overseas, and draws on a technical collaboration with GKN Driveline International, Germany, for its product and process technology. The company operates five manufacturing plants across India.This report presents a summarised analysis of GKN Driveline (India) Limited's financial results for the year ended March 31, 2026, compared with the year ended March 31, 2025. FY26 was a year of profitable growth: revenue grew a modest 6.1% to ₹1,167 Cr, while net profit grew much faster at 26.3% to ₹123 Cr, aided by a decline in cost of materials as a share of revenue and a favourable movement in deferred tax. This drove a meaningful expansion in both EBITDA margin (+2.0 pp) and net profit margin (+1.7 pp). A distinctive feature of the balance sheet is that the company carries no borrowings in either year, funding its operations and growth entirely through equity and internal accruals — total equity grew ~24.1% during the year on the back of retained profits. The analysis below covers headline profitability metrics, a common-size cost structure, key balance sheet items, financial ratios, and a bird's-eye summary, each accompanied by brief commentary highlighting key movements and their implications.1. Revenue, EBITDA, Net Profit & EPS Summary (₹ in Cr)ParticularsFY26FY25YoY ChangeRevenue (Total Income)1,1671,100+6.1%EBITDA209175+19.4%EBITDA Margin17.9%15.9%+2.0 %Net Profit (PAT)12397+26.3%NP Margin (NPM)10.5%8.8%+1.7 %EPS (Basic & Diluted, ₹)96.1276.08+26.3%Revenue grew a modest 6.1%, but profitability grew much faster — EBITDA rose 19.4%, and PAT rose 26.3% — pointing to a genuine improvement in operating efficiency rather than growth alone. EBITDA margin expanded by 2.0% and net margin by 1.7%, aided by lower material costs and a favourable tax outcome, discussed further below.2. Common-Size Statement (as % of Revenue, ₹ in Cr)ParticularsFY25 (₹ Cr)FY25 (% of Rev)FY26 (₹ Cr)FY26 (% of Rev)Revenue (Total Income)1,100100.0%1,167100.0%Cost of materials consumed57652.4%59450.9%Employee benefit expense14313.0%15813.5%Finance costs2.540.2%6.680.6%Depreciation & amortisation423.8%443.8%Cost of materials consumed eased from 52.4% to 50.9% of revenue - the single biggest driver of the margin expansion seen in Table. Employee cost ticked up slightly as a share of revenue, while depreciation stayed flat. Finance costs, though still very small in absolute terms, roughly tripled as a share of revenue (0.2% to 0.6%); given the company carries no borrowings, this rise likely reflects higher lease-related interest under Ind AS 116 rather than fresh debt.3. Key Balance Sheet Items (₹ in Cr)ParticularsFY26 (₹ Cr)FY25 (₹ Cr)Property, plant and equipment257258Inventories11099Trade receivables162136Cash and cash equivalents8966Current borrowingsNilNiNon-current borrowingsNilNilTrade payables (total)184184GKN Driveline's balance sheet stands out for carrying zero borrowings in both years — a genuinely debt-free capital structure. PPE stayed broadly flat, while inventories, receivables and cash all grew roughly in line with or slightly ahead of revenue growth. Trade payables were essentially unchanged YoY, suggesting stable supplier payment terms even as working capital on the asset side expanded modestly.4. Key Ratio AnalysisROE remains strong and broadly stable at around 29-30%, reflecting consistently high capital efficiency. Fixed asset turnover improved further (4.26x to 4.54x), showing the company continues to generate more revenue from its existing asset base. The Debt-to-Equity ratio of 0.00x in both years underscores that all of this growth and profitability was achieved without any reliance on borrowed capital — a conservative and financially resilient profile.RatioFY26FY25YoY ChangeNet Profit Margin10.5%8.8%+1.7 ppReturn on Equity (ROE)29.8%29.2%+0.5 ppFixed Asset Turnover Ratio4.54x4.26x+0.28xDebt-to-Equity Ratio0.00x0.00xNo change
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15 Sep 2026
10 Min Read
Top 5 Performing Unlisted Shares of August 2026
The Indian Unlisted market had an eventful year, and the month gone by was no different either. SEBI's efforts to legitimize pre-IPO trading, a steady flow of DRHPs, and retail channels making transactions in such names very easy are leading to better volume in the secondary. In light of all this, here are the five names that caught my eye because of their price action during the last month. These are a combination of true pre-IPO stories, speculative plays around exchange infrastructure, and one compounder with a solid fundamentals story.1. Matrix Gas & Renewables - Up 57.9%This month's leader, Matrix Gas & Renewables, holds a sizable edge over others. Formed in 2022 and incorporated in Ahmedabad, Matrix functions as a natural gas aggregator, supplying and marketing natural gas, regasified LNG, and LNG cargoes to industries and commercial clients in the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh. Besides this core business, Matrix has been expanding into a parallel growth opportunity in green hydrogen and green ammonia, including manufacture of electrolysers and EPC/BOO projects.Rallying in price this month, the stock follows in line with a renewed pre-IPO buzz – it has already filed draft documents for a listing on the NSE Emerge and has earlier secured funding from a range of investors including Ashneer Grover (co-founder, BharatPe) and other venture and family office funds. However, there is a history of sharp corrections here too – the stock has declined over 50% from its all-time high seen in April 2025 on account of IPO pricing being lower than expected in the grey markets. Promoter linkages to the Gensol Group are another key element to keep in mind.2. Indian Commodity Exchange (ICEX) - Up 40.8%ICEX is the derivatives exchange for commodities and the direct competitor of the publicly listed Multi Commodity Exchange (MCX). It provides for futures trading in the sphere of bullion, energy, metals, and agri-commodities. The shareholders include prominent institutional entities like MMTC, Indian Potash, and Kribhco, along with private investors, which adds some credibility to ICEX as an exchange, a quality that is somewhat uncommon for small unlisted exchanges. ICEX has experienced some problems in its business operations, including multi-year trading suspensions in the past. However, it has been trying lately to position itself as an IPO candidate due to increased interest in exchanges as infrastructure from retail clients (the same trend has fueled NSE and MSEI unlisted stocks this year).The 40.8% increase this month seems to be primarily driven by the aforementioned IPO speculation rather than any particular financial event — financials of ICEX have been little known to date, which should be noted. Furthermore, commodity exchanges are essentially volume-dependent, and there cannot be any simple transfer from NSE and MCX performance to ICEX. It is a company for investors who can support the IPO hypothesis with no clear financial visibility.3. API Holdings (PharmEasy) - Up 34.6%PharmEasy, which owns one of India's largest digital pharmacies and health tech platforms, is showing another step in its comeback story. This company had to face a big decrease in its valuation several years ago because of a tough financing environment and the negative effect of the Thyrocare acquisition, but since then, the firm has been slowly recovering through better margin control and reduction in losses. This month's development looks like it is connected with growing expectations about the IPO attempt and investors' preparation for a potential filing.The business model is strong enough from a structural point of view – there are a lot of opportunities for PharmEasy as the penetration level of organized pharmacies and the diagnostics market in India is still relatively low despite the country's population and the way healthcare expenditure will evolve. However, the re-rating of this stock looks like it is happening way faster than any IPO filing, and the history of high expenses of the company makes IPO price one of the most important factors here.4. Frick India - Up 24.5%In terms of the fundamentals story, there is one name which stands out: Frick India. This firm is India's largest producer of industrial refrigeration and air-conditioning equipment and traces its roots back to a technical cooperation from 1962 between Frick Company, USA, and itself. It provides a complete range of services from design, production, installation, and after-sales servicing. The main market for the firm lies in dairy and food industries, as well as cold chain logistics. Given the fact that India is the largest producer of milk and a significant exporter of fruits and vegetables, it representsa very good business opportunity.While the other stocks mentioned above are largely a product of speculative activities of their owners, the growth in Frick India shares is based on actual positive results in revenues and profits of the company, along with rising EPS and dividends paid regularly. Thus, for those who are afraid of pure IPO speculation, this company can be seen as the best alternative among the firms listed here.5. Sunday Proptech - Up 23.4%Coming up fifth place on our list is the relatively small-cap Sunday Proptech, which has been seeing some pickup in activity on the secondary market this month. It’s certainly part of a trend toward growing interest in real-estate technology and fractional-ownership platforms, a sector which has gained increasing traction among Indian retail and HNI investors as SEBI seeks to regulate fractional real estate ownership. On the other hand, when compared with the other companies mentioned on this list, information available on Sunday Proptech is relatively scarce.This may be considered a blessing and a curse. While it certainly could suggest undervaluation in this case if the company is performing well, it does leave investors with much less to go on when valuing the stock’s current price action.The TakeawayThe leaderboard for the month gives a decent idea of the current state of sentiment in the Indian private equity market: real IPO stories backed by filings (Matrix Gas, PharmEasy), an overvalued infrastructure-for-exchange concept without any known fundamentals (ICEX), an earnings-backed compounding story (Frick India), and a niche player that fits into a wider market theme (Sunday Proptech). The key thing to keep in mind is that private shares are priced through low-volume negotiated trades in secondary markets, not via ongoing price discovery on exchanges, which means that any monthly change in prices, positive or negative, is usually more pronounced than what one might see in a listed security. Any potential investor interested in any of these companies should take their performance in the month as a directional hint, at best, and dig deeper into the financials and backgrounds of these companies before committing any money.
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15 Sep 2026
6 Min Read
MSE just facilitated India's first tokenised corporate bond. The headline isn't the real story — the balance sheet is.
On 11 September 2026, Metropolitan Stock Exchange (MSE) announced that its Electronic Bond Platform (EBP) had processed a tokenised corporate bond for IIFL Finance, under SEBI and RBI's new "Demat 2.0" pilot — launched jointly by SEBI Chairman Tuhin Kanta Pandey and RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra at the Global Fintech Fest.If you track MSE's unlisted shares, this read like the breakthrough moment. It isn't — or at least, not on its own. Here's why, and what actually matters instead.First, what is an EBP — and why does it exist?When a company wants to raise ₹50–500 crore through bonds, it usually doesn't do a public issue — it places the bonds privately with a handful of institutional investors. Before 2016, this happened over phone calls between the CFO and a few fund managers, with no visibility into who got what price. SEBI's Electronic Book Provider (EBP) framework put this process on a public screen instead: issuers notify the market, investors bid, and the system allots bonds to the lowest-cost bidders first.Since May 2025, using an EBP is mandatory for any private bond placement of ₹20 crore or more (down from ₹50 crore) — and since well over 90% of India's corporate bond issuance is private placement, this isn't a niche rule. NSE, BSE and MSE have all held this EBP licence since it launched on 1 July 2016.What Demat 2.0 actually changesOn 10 September 2026, SEBI and RBI launched a regulatory sandbox pilot to test tokenised corporate bonds. Three issuances have gone through so far, totalling ₹1,025 crore:IssuerDateAmountInvestorsREC Limited7 Sept₹500 cr18Larsen & Toubro9 Sept₹500 cr4IIFL Finance9 Sept₹25 cr1The bidding process, the ₹20 crore threshold, the ISIN, and the bond's legal character are all unchanged — SEBI has been explicit that tokenisation doesn't create a new asset class or a safer instrument. What changes is what happens after allotment: the bond exists as a digital token on a ledger owned by India's depositories, settlement runs through RBI's wholesale CBDC (e₹), and both legs — cash and securities — settle atomically, on the same day, instead of the usual T+2. Coupons and redemptions can eventually be automated through smart contracts.Crucially, this back-end upgrade was handed to NSE, BSE and MSE simultaneously. MSE facilitating the IIFL deal is a genuine first — but it's not an exclusive technological edge. Secondary trading and retail access are both still pending, with no date announced, and only 23 investors have participated across all three deals so far.So why is this MSE news at all, if the tech is shared?Because the real story sitting underneath the press release is what's happened to MSE's balance sheet over the last 20 months — and it's a much bigger deal than one ₹25 crore bond.MSE has held its EBP licence since 2016. In FY26, its entire operating revenue was ₹3.4 crore, against a net loss of ₹25.8 crore (an improvement from ₹34.2 crore the year before, but still a loss). For a decade, NSE built commanding share in this business — it now holds roughly 95% of the debt RFQ market — while MSE barely registered. That wasn't a technology gap or a regulatory gap; MSE always had the same licence NSE did. It was a resourcing gap: a loss-making exchange simply couldn't afford to hire and retain the relationship bankers that bond issuers actually pick platforms based on.That constraint has now changed dramatically. Over two rounds:December 2024 / January 2025: MSE raised ₹238 crore, with Billionbrains Garage Ventures (Groww's parent), Rainmatter Investments (Zerodha founders' fund), Share India Securities and Securocorp Securities India each taking roughly equal stakes at ₹2/share, pegging MSE's valuation near ₹1,200 crore.August 2025: MSE raised a further ₹1,000 crore, this time from a much broader consortium — Peak XV Partners, Trust Investment Advisors, Jainam Broking, Monarch Networth, and several other brokers and funds.Total raised: roughly ₹1,238–1,240 crore — about 365 times MSE's annual operating revenue. Total equity jumped from ₹396.69 crore in FY25 to ₹1,369.29 crore in FY26. MSE's stated priority for this capital is to deepen liquidity in its equity cash segment first, then derivatives — the bond platform isn't even the headline use of funds. But it does mean MSE can now afford the one thing it never could before: a real relationship-driven debt capital markets desk, without betting the company on it.Why Zerodha and Groww specifically matter hereA ₹59.5 crore cheque each is small change for either firm. The more interesting angle is what they represent: between Zerodha's roughly 6.5 million and Groww's roughly 13 million active investors, MSE's cap table now includes two of India's largest retail distribution networks.That matters because Demat 2.0's later phases are explicitly aimed at retail access to corporate bonds — and tokenisation makes fractionalising a bond into small, retail-sized tickets technically straightforward. If and when that phase arrives, distribution reach — not exchange infrastructure — decides who actually gets those bonds in front of retail investors. Two of India's biggest brokers already sit on MSE's shareholder register.There's also a credibility effect that's easy to underrate: a bond arranger deciding whether to route a deal through MSE is implicitly asking "will this platform still be relevant in three years?" A decade of losses made that a fair question. Backers like Rainmatter, Groww's parent, and Peak XV Partners change that calculus.One more detail worth flagging: Trust Investment Advisors — the arranger on the very IIFL tokenised bond in the press release — was also one of the 29 investors in MSE's August 2025 fundraise. That's not proof of anything improper; arrangers investing in exchange platforms they work with isn't unusual. But it's a clean illustration of exactly the dynamic described above — capital and relationships arriving together.What this doesn't meanCapital buys hiring capacity, not a decade of trust. Treasurers who've routed every bond issue through NSE since 2018 don't switch platforms because a new VP joined MSE.The bond desk may stay a secondary priority — MSE's own language points to the equity cash segment and derivatives as the primary use of the new capital.Demat 2.0 is still a sandbox pilot: no secondary trading yet, no retail access yet, and no announced timeline for either.NSE isn't standing still — it received the same infrastructure on the same day and can match fee cuts easily out of its existing scale.What to actually track over the next few quarters: EBP results are published publicly by every exchange. The number that matters isn't the press release — it's how many bond issues, month over month, start landing on MSE's platform versus NSE's and BSE's, and whether MSE visibly builds out a debt capital markets team. Everything else is narrative.
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12 Sep 2026
10 Min Read
ESDS Software Solutions: From Pre-IPO Pick to 111% Stock Gains
While other IPOs only promise investors, ESDS Software Solutions Limited proved its worth when it went public on Dalal Street on September 4, 2026. The stock of the Nashik-based artificial intelligence-driven cloud services company was up by 76% at the time of listing. And even after that, it continued going up during the day and reached as high as 111%. For those investors who had been holding on to the shares of the company since before its listing – and some of them would have gained access to it via platforms such as Planify – this listing would not have been an exciting moment; rather, a reward for the decision that they had taken months, and sometimes years, back. This is the story of how ESDS became one of the most successful market debuts of 2026 despite being an unlisted company until then.ESDS Software Solutions: The Pre-IPO Journey Behind a Standout Market DebutESDS Software Solutions was founded in August 2005 and has spent over two decades creating the business that retail investors came to know about only when its IPO was launched. It provides end-to-end cloud infrastructure, managed services, data center operations, and software solutions using artificial intelligence to serve BFSI institutions, governments, and enterprises in India and beyond. The proprietary eNlight cloud infrastructure solution created by ESDS Software Solutions, which has both patent and auto-scalability capabilities, has served as the key differentiating factor for the company in the competition against big names such as AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud, especially in segments like BFSI and government, where data sovereignty and compliance become as important as computational power. It operates from three centers located at Navi Mumbai, Nashik, and Bengaluru that cover 50,000 square feet area with a 10 Gbps connectivity speed backbone. The company has built the kind of business that needs huge infrastructural investments that usually remain private for a long period of time, and that's precisely why the pre-IPO shares of ESDS Software Solutions had already become a trade.ESDS Software Solutions' IPO and Listing Day PerformanceThe ESDS IPO worth ₹720 crores was a prime example of pent-up demand. The offering, which was only a fresh issue consisting of 1,67,83,216 shares, without any offer-for-sale component, commenced bidding on August 28, 2026, and ended on September 1, 2026, with a price range of ₹408-429 per share. Within a short while after the bidding closed, the issue had been oversubscribed 142.88 times: qualified institutional buyers applied for 275 times their allotted shares; non-institutional investors were 200 times their allotment, and retail investors were almost 41 times their allocation. Even before the commencement of bidding for the issue, ESDS had raised ₹216 crores through anchor investors.This demand was quickly demonstrated right from the beginning. ESDS' listing prices were ₹757 at a 76.46% premium to the issue price of ₹429 on the NSE, and ₹746.30 at a 73.96% premium to its issue price on the BSE. This surge was far from over. During the very session, the scrip surged to its 20% upper circuit price of ₹908.40 on the NSE and ₹895.55 on the BSE, representing an increase of about 111.75% and 108.75%, respectively, in comparison with the issue price. At the end of the first day of listing, the market capitalization of ESDS had reached ₹10,647 crore on the NSE and ₹10,497 crore on the BSE, with an overall turnover of more than ₹1,461 crore.The Pre-IPO Opportunity: How Planify Investors Accessed ESDS EarlyEven before ESDS had rung the stock exchange’s opening bell, its shares had been traded in the private market, the very platform where Planify thrives. ESDS made its first draft filing to go public in December 2021, but because of adverse market conditions at the time, the firm withdrew its offer, making it continue operating as a privately held business for several years until its public listing in 2026. Within this period, the platforms tracking privately-held companies — including Planify — have monitored ESDS as one of the prominent players in the pre-IPO cloud infrastructure segment, given its robust financial performance, strong ties with the government and BFSI sectors, and its recent IPO efforts following the hiring of DAM Capital Advisors as its book-running lead manager.Pre-listed share prices of ESDS were offered in the range of ₹410 just before the official IPO application — a value which could be accessed by an investor using platforms such as Planify long before the pricing of ₹408–429 was decided for its IPO. And that is precisely the essence of pre-IPO investing: being able to invest in a company at a valuation that was privately negotiated instead of one that came at IPO day due to retail madness, and holding until the IPO happens. In the case of ESDS, the IPO price of ₹429 and further listing day gains were simply the next steps in a journey they had already started.Listing Premium and Post-Listing Price MomentumHowever, the tale did not come to an end there. ESDS kept on getting buying interest even in the coming week and made new 20% upper circuits in various sessions during that period. By September 8, 2026, the stock managed to touch the price of ₹1,308.05, which was an increase of almost 205% compared to its ₹429 issue price, and marked a new 52-week high for the stock in that period. Nevertheless, the run continued for the stock: by September 9, with the announcement of a new ₹1.25 billion AI infrastructure deal and a "Buy" initiation from Choice Equity Broking at the price target of ₹1,550, the stock managed to make another upper circuit at the price of ₹1,438.85, which was beyond ₹15,300 crore in terms of market capitalization.Let’s try to be more precise about the figures we’re talking about here. It wasn’t the 111% rise during the listing day, since that was the rise above the circuit limit on that one day, in contrast to the 76% gain on the day of listing; rather, it was the post-listing move that made it touch 205% and 235%. For investors assessing such results, it is all of this process starting from the issue price, then the listing price, and the days after listing that determines the actual returns, and one needs to keep in mind that when a stock goes up by three times in one week, it might just as well come down.From Unlisted to NSE/BSE-Listed: ESDS' Growth TrajectoryWhile it might seem like the positive investor sentiment stems from scarcity of IPOs, the real driver behind it is the accelerating performance of the core business itself. ESDS generated revenue of ₹376.64 crore in FY25 and increased it to ₹480.65 crore in FY26, showing a growth of 28% YoY. Even more impressively, the profitability of the company showed an even sharper improvement – from ₹55.61 crore in FY25 to ₹120.82 crore in FY26, which is a 117% increase and resulted in EPS of about ₹12 in FY26. This level of operating leverage – where profit grows almost five times faster than revenues – is exactly the tipping point when it comes to re-rating post-IPO.The funds raised by the IPO will be used in furthering that process: growing data centre capacity to 14-20 MW in the next one to two years, developing cloud infrastructure with AI-driven GPUs to take advantage of increased enterprise AI workloads, and raising long-term working capital. Promoters Piyush Somani, Komal Somani, and the P.O. Somani Family Trust kept an overall stake of 45.78% before the IPO, resulting in an entrepreneur-owned, concentrated shareholder base that pre-IPO investors find attractive in that very way.What This Means for Future Pre-IPO Opportunities on PlanifyThe journey of ESDS — from its initial quotation of ₹410 as an unlisted stock to an immediate surge past 111% on its listing day and an additional jump above 200% within days — makes for an excellent example of why investors monitor the unlisted market in the first place. It was not a question of making a quick buck on IPO day but years of steady revenue growth and a credible cloud infrastructure business, together with some key tie-ups with the government and BFSI sector that investors identified as soon as the company got listed.This is the type of story that platforms such as Planify are meant to bring out by spotting the fast-growing, well-managed private firms before the IPO launch renders them a rush to retail investors. It is not every IPO pre-list firm that will turn into another ESDS story, since subscription craze, stock price pop at listing, and sustained run-ups are not the norm. The shares are also not always without their risks, as unlisted stocks have different valuation and liquidity risks from listed ones on the NSE and BSE, but for those ready to do their homework on revenues and margins before the listing, ESDS is a good reminder of why there is a pre-IPO phase in the first place.
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11 Sep 2026
10 Min Read
Nayara Energy Unlisted Share Price: Complete Investor Guide
Notably, Nayara Energy hasn't always been Nayara Energy. It started off as Essar Oil, a listed corporation on the Indian stock market.
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11 Sep 2026
3 Min Read
Sterlite Electric Limited – FY26 Results
Sterlite Electric (formerly Sterlite Power Transmission) is a power transmission products company that designs, manufactures and supplies overhead conductors, OPGW, EHV power cables, master system integration (MSI) services, and dark-fibre "Convergence" solutions. In October 2024 it demerged its transmission-asset ownership business (now Resonia), and FY26 is its first full year as a pure manufacturing/products company. It has filed a DRHP for an IPO.Revenue, EBITDA, Net Profit & EPS Summary (₹ in Cr, Consolidated, Continuing Operations)ParticularsFY26FY25YoY changeRevenue6,2544,956+26.2%EBITDA491472+4.0%EBITDA Margin7.85%9.53%Net Finance Cost121155−21.9%Profit Before Tax301262+14.9%Net Profit (PAT, continuing ops)237183+29.5%PAT attributable to shareholders210–EPS (Basic & Diluted)14.57–Revenue grew 26.2% on strong conductor and cable demand, but EBITDA grew only 4% as raw-material costs (mostly aluminium) rose 48%, eating two-thirds of every revenue rupee versus 56% a year earlier. Most of the PAT growth came from a lower net finance cost, not operations. Note: the P&L also shows a headline ₹746 crore figure driven by a ₹509 crore unrealised commodity-hedge gain sitting in Other Comprehensive Income — not operating profit, and expected to reverse against FY27 raw-material costs.Segment / Order Book Mix (₹ in Cr)PlatformFY26 Revenue ShareOrder BookOrder Book ShareOverhead conductors & OPGW—3,68156%Power cables—1,77527%MSI services—75311%Convergence (fibre)—4106%Conductors + cables (₹ cr)4,807 (77% of revenue)EPC (₹ cr)1,164Convergence lease income (₹ cr)119Closing order book of ₹6,619 crore is about 1.06x FY26 revenue. Exports fell sharply to 7% of revenue (from 20% in FY25) even as new markets (UK, Nigeria, Oman, Nepal, Bhutan) opened up.Key Balance Sheet Items (₹ in Cr, Consolidated)ParticularsFY26FY25Net worth1,9931,434Gross borrowings609327Cash + bank balances1,4021,224Net cash793896Inventories552367Trade receivables1,2591,082Contract assets (unbilled)593254Acceptances (supplier credit)1,476986Capital work-in-progress31190Total assets6,0604,259Net worth rose ₹559 crore, but only ₹237 crore of that is earned profit — the rest is largely the unrealised ₹509 crore hedge reserve. Working capital ballooned (net working capital up from ₹1,071 cr to ₹1,686 cr) as inventories, receivables and unbilled revenue all grew faster than sales, funded partly by stretching supplier credit.Cash Flow (₹ in Cr)ParticularsFY25FY26Operating cash flow647359Capex235298Dividend paid1283Net change in cash+102−65Operating cash flow nearly halved despite 30% profit growth, as the working-capital build absorbed cash. Free cash flow after capex was roughly ₹60 crore.Key Ratio Analysis (Consolidated)ParticularsFY26FY25EBITDA Margin7.85%9.53%Net Profit Margin3.79%3.69%Return on Equity (on closing equity)~11.9%–Return on Capital Employed16.9%24.8%Debt-to-Equity Ratio0.31x–Debt Service Coverage Ratio0.84x–P/E (indicative, ₹478/share)~28x–P/B (indicative)~3.4x–EV/EBITDA (indicative)~12x–At the unlisted indicative price of ₹478 (market cap ~₹6,750 crore on a fully diluted 14.13 crore shares), Sterlite trades at roughly half of peer Apar Industries' earnings multiple (Apar: ~60x P/E, ~13x P/B). ROCE fell from 24.8% to 16.9% as capital deployed into the new Vadodara cable plant (₹311 crore CWIP) hasn't yet ramped into revenue. The ₹478 price sits almost exactly at the FY25 PE round price of ₹473, and a lender (PTC Cables) declined to exercise ₹270 crore of warrants at that same price in FY26.
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11 Sep 2026
16 Min Read
India’s Khagantak-243: The Glide Bomb Test That Could Put JSR Dynamics on the Defence Map
India’s indigenous defence push has added another milestone with the successful drop test of the Khagantak-243, a 300-kg class long-range glide bomb developed through a partnership between Nagpur-based defence startup JSR Dynamics and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL). The trial was conducted from a Su-30MKI fighter aircraft and reportedly achieved all planned flight objectives. With a claimed stand-off range of around 140–180 km, the weapon is designed to allow fighter aircraft to strike targets such as runways, bunkers and command centres from a safer distance.How the Khagantak-243 WorksUnlike conventional bombs, the Khagantak-243 does not use an engine. After being released from an aircraft at high altitude and speed, its wings and control surfaces allow it to glide towards its target using aerodynamic lift. The weapon combines an Inertial Navigation System (INS) with multi-GNSS for navigation, while an optional electro-optical/infrared seeker can further improve terminal accuracy. The reported accuracy is around 10 metres without a seeker and under 5 metres with one, while the weapon carries a 125-kg Mk-81 blast-fragmentation warhead.JSR Dynamics: From Defence Startup to Potential ManufacturerFor JSR Dynamics, the test could represent an important step toward commercialisation. The company, founded in 2018, has focused on developing defence technologies and remains in the pre-revenue stage. Under the Khagantak-243 programme, JSR Dynamics has worked on the aerodynamic airframe and control systems, while BEL has contributed the guidance electronics. The startup has reportedly raised around $19.2 million, with its January 2025 funding round taking place at ₹6,514 per share. The company has attracted institutional and angel investors as it works toward bringing its products from development into production.The Investment Story: Trial Success Is Not Yet RevenueThe successful trial is encouraging, but investors should be careful about what it actually means for JSR Dynamics. A successful defence test does not automatically translate into a government purchase order. The weapon may still require additional testing, validation and procurement approval before large-scale production begins. The key investment trigger will therefore be the transition from successful trials → qualification → government orders → production → revenue. If JSR Dynamics can successfully navigate that process, the company could potentially move from a pre-revenue defence startup to a significant domestic defence manufacturer.Bottom LineThe Khagantak-243 test is an important technology validation milestone for JSR Dynamics and India's private defence ecosystem, but the real value creation will come only if the technology moves from testing to actual procurement. For investors, the story is therefore less about the successful drop test alone and more about whether it can lead to orders, production, and sustainable revenue growth. Until those milestones are achieved, JSR Dynamics remains a high-potential but high-execution-risk defence startup.
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11 Sep 2026
3 Min Read
Bharat Hotels Limited – FY26 Results
Bharat Hotels Limited, incorporated in 1981, operates luxury hotels across India under The Lalit brand, spanning city hotels (Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Kolkata, Jaipur, Chandigarh), palaces (Udaipur, Srinagar) and resorts (Goa, Bekal, Khajuraho, Mangar). It also owns two commercial towers in Delhi (World Trade Centre and World Trade Tower). The company is unlisted, run by Chairperson Dr. Jyotsna Suri, and is majority owned by Deeksha Holding Limited (40.42%).Revenue, EBITDA, Net Profit & EPS Summary (₹ in Cr, Standalone)ParticularsFY26FY25YoY changeRevenue815.69841.90−3.1%EBITDA303.84367.62−17.3%EBITDA Margin37.2%43.7%Finance Costs128.61181.25−29.0%Profit Before Tax162.70162.92−0.1%Net Profit (PAT)115.9692.97+24.7%NP Margin (NPM)14.2%11.0%Revenue declined 3.1%, driven mainly by disruption at the Srinagar palace amid regional unrest. Yet PAT rose a strong 24.7% - not from operations, which actually deteriorated (EBITDA down 17.3%), but from a ₹52.6 crore cut in finance costs after refinancing debentures at better rates in January 2026. Operating performance weakened; profit improved purely on cheaper debt.Revenue Mix (₹ in Cr, Standalone)ParticularsFY26YoY changeRoom rentals452.76−0.9%Food and beverage235.21−6.3%Liquor and wine36.22−7.9%Rent & maintenance (towers)29.54+4.6%Banquet & equipment rentals27.33−8.6%Other services25.94+7.8%Management & consultancy fees4.78–Membership programm3.29−53.7%Rooms held roughly flat, but every discretionary spending line F&B, liquor, banqueting, membership fell sharply. These carry high operating leverage on a fixed cost base, which explains most of the EBITDA decline.Key Balance Sheet Items (₹ in Cr, Consolidated)ParticularsFY26FY25Property, plant & equipment1,523.571,560.03Capital work-in-progress291.38287.99Goodwill84.2584.25Cash and bank78.4055.91Total assets2,244.422,249.14Total borrowings775.30921.89Total equity1,059.10944.59Debt fell ₹146.6 crore in one year, cutting gearing from 44.49% to 36.35%. But ₹278.72 crore of CWIP (largely the stalled Ahmedabad hotel) has sat idle over three years, with its land-allotment deadline already lapsed and an extension still pending.Key Ratio Analysis (Consolidated)ParticularsFY26FY25Net Profit Margin13.1%9.4%Return on Equity~11.5%–P/E23.5x31.7xP/B2.53x2.83xEV/EBITDA9.5x–Debt-to-Equity (approx.)0.73x0.98xAt an indicative price of ₹367 (market cap ₹2,794.96 cr), Bharat Hotels trades at the lowest P/E and EV/EBITDA among luxury/upscale peers (Chalet, Ventive, Juniper, EIH) - but also has the lowest net margin in the group. The discount reflects a pending ₹1,063.75 crore NDMC claim on its flagship Delhi property (roughly equal to total equity), a leasehold-heavy asset base, and no daily liquidity as an unlisted stock.
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10 Sep 2026
10 Min Read
Insolare Energy Unlisted Shares: A Solar Sector Investment Guide
EPC company that provides services related to solar power projects such as rooftop, ground-mounted, floating solar, and solar parks to C&I clients.
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09 Sep 2026
10 Min Read
What Happens to Unlisted Shares After a Company Gets Delisted?
In the case of the delisting of a listed company, the question that comes up in the minds of investors is where their investments go from there. The good thing about the delisting of the stock is that the delisting process does not imply any loss of ownership rights; it just makes it difficult for the investors to sell or buy the stocks through the NSE or BSE platforms.The process of delisting implies that the listed stock will become an unlisted stock overnight. After completion of the SEBI delisting process, the shares will no longer appear on the exchanges' order books, price discovery will become very hard, and liquidity will be seriously reduced. The shareholder retains all his rights but faces difficulty in selling his stock since he will have to find the buyer himself.Voluntary vs. Compulsory DelistingAspectVoluntary DelistingCompulsory DelistingWho initiatesPromoter/acquirer, by choiceStock exchange or SEBI, as a penaltyPrice discoveryReverse book building (shareholders bid an exit price)Independent valuer fixes a fair valuePromoter's obligationMust acquire shares at the discovered price if the 90% threshold is metMust acquire public shares within 3 months at the valuer's priceExit windowAt least 1 year post-delisting, at the discovered priceSimilar exit rights, though enforcement can be slowerIf threshold not metOffer fails; tendered shares are returned, company stays listedNot applicable — compulsory delisting proceeds regardlessHow the Two Routes Actually DifferA voluntary delisting process, on the contrary, would be relatively favorable for the investors. The corporation conducts a reverse book-building in which the public shareholders offer the price they demand for their departure from the business. In case the promoter fails to get over 90% of the shareholding (inclusive of their own holding), the offer fails, and the corporation continues its listing while the tendered shares are returned. Since a September 2024 SEBI amendment, frequently traded companies also have a second voluntary route available: a fixed price process, where the promoter sets an exit price upfront at a minimum 15% premium to the floor price, instead of leaving price discovery to reverse book building. This gives promoters a faster, more predictable alternative in cases where the stock is liquid enough for the floor price to be a reliable benchmark.In compulsory delisting, however, the situation differs. It is a process conducted due to the regulatory requirements of the government and is initiated by non-compliance, suspension, or exchange action. Here, an independent valuer fixes the fair value of shares instead of the market value. The promoter is obliged to buy back the public shareholding at such valuation within three months.What This Means for ShareholdersA few practical points worth flagging for anyone holding shares through a delisting event:1. You don't lose ownership — shares stay in your demat account and continue to carry dividend and voting rights until you sell them.2. A mandatory exit window applies — SEBI requires the acquirer to keep the exit offer open for at least one year after delisting, accepting shares at the discovered/fair price even if you missed the initial bidding window.3. Tendering is a taxable sale — capital gains tax applies when you exit through the delisting offer, with holding-period rules under the Income Tax Act determining whether it's short-term or long-term.4. After the one-year window, liquidity dries up fast — your only route becomes the over-the-counter (OTC) or unlisted shares market, where pricing is opaque, counterparties are harder to find, and trades can take weeks or months to close.5. Relisting is possible but not immediate — SEBI mandates a minimum three-year cooling-off period (Regulation 40) before a delisted company can approach the markets again, and any relisting is treated as a fresh IPO-style process.If You Choose to Hold Rather Than TenderIf you decide not to tender during the exit window — for whatever reason, be it a disagreement regarding valuation or simply being oblivious to the whole process — your shares will not be rendered worthless; however, they will be much more difficult to turn into money. After one year of the mandated waiting period is up, the way of getting rid of your unlisted shares is a private sale through OTC platforms that specialize in unlisted scrips. Such platforms exist and provide actual buyers' interest; however, price visibility will be considerably reduced from what you had on an exchange, and the settlement time frame will increase tremendously from your usual market sell order.When assessing the decision to either tender right away, wait through the window period, or just ignore the whole thing, there are usually three main factors that play into the final decision. These factors include your belief about the company's fundamental value (as the promoters often take their companies off listing due to perceived undervaluation), the liquidity premium you are ready to forego, and the tax effectiveness of the exit strategy. Investors believing in the future of a company, especially in the case of a delisting for restructuring or capital reorganization rather than financial distress, tend to lean toward holding on rather than tendering, betting that a future relisting or buyback will fetch a better price than the current exit offer.The Bottom LineThe delisting process is more of a shift of venue than the end. The money does not evaporate; it just gets shifted from the liquid environment of exchanges to the illiquid environment of private deals, with SEBI rules guaranteeing a safe exit for you.
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08 Sep 2026
10 Min Read
Risks of Investing in Unlisted Shares: What Nobody Tells You
Listed shares are tradable within a few seconds whenever the market is open. Unlisted shares never are.
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