Planify Feed

A shell company under OYO's umbrella, OYO Financial and Technology Services, had barely anything on its books in March 2025: no hotels, no real revenue, just ₹2.5 crore in assets. A year later it had been renamed Sunday Proptech Limited and had grown into a company worth ₹7,117 crore in total assets, running hotels across the US, Dubai, the UK, and India, with 49 subsidiaries under it. OYO's ownership share dropped from nearly 100% to just 31% in that same window. This wasn't organic growth. It was a company built from scratch in twelve months through acquisitions, borrowing, and a major shareholder reshuffle.

How the business actually works

Most hotel companies pick a lane: either you own the real estate and collect rent, or you operate the hotel and take a management fee. Sunday Proptech is trying to do both at once, buying underperforming but well-located hotels, fixing them up, and running them directly so it captures both the property value and the operating profit.

It holds these hotels three different ways. Some are owned outright (mostly in the US, worth around ₹4,590 crore). Some are on long-term leases, which is a cheaper way to enter a market and is how it operates in Dubai and the UK. And some are managed on behalf of other owners, which needs no capital at all.

What's notable is what it chose not to build. It doesn't have its own hotel brand or booking technology. Instead it licenses brand names like Motel 6 and Studio 6 in the US from G6 Hospitality, and uses OYO's own brands (Sunday Hotels, Palette, Townhouse) in India and the Gulf. The entire cost of licensing all these brands for the year came to just ₹2.4 crore, a tiny fraction against a ₹7,117 crore asset base. The logic is that building brand recognition and tech from the ground up only pays off once you're operating at massive scale, so for now it's cheaper to rent that infrastructure.

Where the money is versus where the money comes from

The clearest way to see the strategy is to compare where the assets sit against where the revenue is actually coming from.

The US holds nearly three-quarters of all assets but only produced about a sixth of total revenue. That's because most of the American hotels were bought late in the financial year and are still being renovated, so they haven't started earning yet. Dubai shows the opposite pattern: a smaller asset base but the biggest revenue contribution, because it runs mostly on leases that generate rental income right away without tying up large amounts of capital. India, despite being where OYO started and where most people know the brand from, barely registers here with just ₹6 crore in revenue.

The 38 hotel purchase and an accounting quirk worth understanding

During the year, the company bought 38 hotel properties in the US for roughly ₹3,178 crore. Eight of them came from two sellers in November 2025, and the rest were picked up from various sellers before the year closed. All of these are being converted into the extended-stay format under the Motel 6 and Studio 6 brands.

Here's the part that needs a careful look. When a company buys a business, its auditors assess the fair value of everything acquired. In this case, the auditors valued the acquired property at ₹4,504 crore, well above the ₹3,178 crore actually paid. After subtracting a deferred tax liability of ₹278 crore, that leaves a gap of roughly ₹1,047 crore. Accounting rules call this a "bargain purchase gain," and management is framing it as proof they negotiated well and got more value than they paid for.

Three things are worth keeping in mind about that gain. First, it isn't cash. No money moved into the bank because of it; it's purely a valuation adjustment sitting in the capital reserve. Second, this single gain makes up about 78% of the company's entire net worth of ₹1,350 crore, meaning if you strip it out, the balance sheet looks a lot thinner. Third, the report itself notes that the purchase price allocation hasn't been finalized yet. These are provisional numbers based on management's own assessment, and while they don't expect big changes, nothing is locked in.

Also worth noting: those same 38 hotels only generated ₹44 crore in revenue since they were acquired, and actually posted a pre-tax loss of ₹28.6 crore. They've been bought, but they haven't been fixed yet.

Who's actually behind the company

A year ago ownership was simple: OYO's parent, Oravel Stays, held basically all of it. That changed after the company issued new shares through a private placement, raised about ₹239 crore, and added a large batch of bonus shares. The ownership table now looks very different.

OYO never sold any shares, it simply got diluted as new shares were issued to others. But the effect was significant: the terms of these new share agreements meant OYO lost operational control of the company. It's no longer treated as the parent company in accounting terms and is now booked as a joint venture partner instead.

Two details stand out here. The new largest shareholder, Astera Ventures, was renamed from something called Tattva Valuers Private Limited around the same time all this was happening. And the annual report explicitly states the company has no identifiable promoter and is professionally managed, meaning the ultimate owner behind that biggest shareholder isn't disclosed anywhere in the filing.

The debt picture

Borrowing exploded over the year. Total borrowings sit at ₹3,203 crore, and once you add lease obligations of ₹2,171 crore and other financial liabilities, then subtract the small amount of cash on hand, net debt comes to roughly ₹5,443 crore against equity of just ₹1,350 crore. That's a debt to equity ratio of about 4 times, up from just 0.34 times the year before.

The reported interest expense is a bit misleading too. Finance costs for the year came to ₹115 crore, but only ₹22 crore of that was actual interest on loans; most of it was interest tied to lease obligations. That's because the biggest loan facility, ₹1,850 crore from Citibank, was only drawn down eleven days before the financial year ended. On a full year basis, interest on the total borrowings at a typical rate of 9 to 10% would likely run north of ₹280 crore, meaning the real interest burden hasn't shown up in these numbers yet.

Most of the lending is secured directly against the American hotel portfolio, largely through Citibank, with a mix of other lenders including mezzanine financing, private placement notes, and some high interest loans from entities that are also shareholders in the company, like InCred and Astera Ventures. One of the lenders, RA Hospitality Holdings, is linked to OYO's founder.

The revenue dependency that stands out most

This is probably the most important thing to understand about the company right now. Total revenue from operations was ₹269 crore, and rental income alone made up ₹223 crore of that, or 83% of the total.

Looking at the related party disclosures, nearly all of that rental income traces back to other OYO group entities: OYO's Dubai hotel management arm, its UK operating company, its vacation rentals business, and a few smaller OYO-linked entities. Adding those up gets you almost exactly to the ₹223 crore rental income figure. The geographic pattern matches too: revenue from Dubai, the UK, and India lines up closely with payments from OYO group companies in those same markets.

In other words, essentially all of the rental income is coming from within the OYO ecosystem itself. The only revenue that comes from genuinely outside parties is the roughly ₹46 crore earned from the American hotels' actual guest bookings.

Management describes the relationship with OYO as a partnership rather than a dependency. That's fair when it comes to brand licensing, which only costs ₹2.4 crore. But when 83% of total revenue comes from the same corporate family, and all these related party deals are disclosed as being done at arm's length with a clean, unqualified audit report, the word "independent" is carrying a lot of weight.

A handful of other things worth flagging

The company paid out a dividend this year, ₹3 crore as an interim payment and another ₹1.5 crore proposed as a final payment, despite carrying over ₹3,200 crore in debt in its very first year of operating at this scale. Management calls this a signal of confidence; others might see it as cash that could have gone toward interest payments instead.

The company doesn't even have a website, a detail the annual report mentions directly when explaining why certain filings weren't uploaded online.

Governance is thin for a company this size. The board has only three non-executive directors, no managing director, and no whole-time director, despite overseeing 49 subsidiaries spread across four countries. Both the CFO and company secretary were only appointed in February 2026, just two months before the financial year closed.

And while the lease-heavy approach in Dubai and the UK is genuinely capital efficient since it doesn't require buying property outright, it isn't risk free either. Those ₹2,171 crore in lease obligations are fixed, multi-year commitments. Rent doesn't go down if a hotel's occupancy drops, and some of these lease contracts even come with financial covenants, essentially behaving the way a lender's loan conditions would.

The bottom line

What's been built here is a highly leveraged bet on turning around budget hotels in America, financed largely through foreign debt, run by a team with deep OYO ties, and currently kept afloat by rental income from OYO's own group companies. It's a coherent strategy, and the price paid for the hotel portfolio does appear to have been a good deal on paper.

But the numbers from this first year describe a company that's just getting started, not one that has proven its model works. The reported profit of ₹13.5 crore sits almost entirely on top of a ₹1,047 crore non-cash accounting gain that hasn't even been finalized yet. The real interest cost from all that new borrowing hasn't fully hit the books. The newly acquired American hotels are currently losing money. And operating cash flow of just ₹32 crore is a fairly thin cushion under net debt of ₹5,443 crore.

The year ahead is where this story will really get tested, once the full interest burden lands, once the Motel 6 conversions need to actually start filling rooms, and once it becomes clear whether revenue from outside the OYO family can grow faster than the debt taken on to build all this.

​Sun Drops Energia Limited will be convening an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM No. 02/2026-27), as per the Notice issued on August 21, 2026, which will take place on Monday, September 14, 2026. The meeting will commence at 09:30 AM IST at the registered office of the company.

Key Agenda Items for the EGM:

• Increase in Authorised Share Capital: Approval for increase in the Authorised Share Capital from INR 50,00,00,000 (comprising of 10,00,00,000 Equity Shares of INR 5 each) to INR 50,80,00,000 (comprising of 10,00,00,000 Equity Shares of INR 5 each and 16,00,000 Preference Shares of INR 5 each) by way of creation of 16,00,000 Preference Shares, together with amendment of Clause V of the Memorandum of Association.
  
• Acquisition of Target Company: Approval for the acquisition of up to 1,70,84,853 equity shares which are fully paid-up (upto 100% of equity share capital) of DEK and Mavericks Green Energy Limited at a price of INR 32.66 per equity share, aggregating to INR 55,80,44,927.
  
• Issue of CCPS on preferential basis: Approval for issuance and allotment of up to 15,89,781 Compulsorily Convertible Preference Shares (CCPS) of face value INR 5 each at an issue price of INR 351.02 per CCPS (inclusive of premium of INR 346.02 per CCPS) on preferential basis for consideration other than cash
  
• Terms and Conversion of CCPS: CCPS have a non-cumulative preferential dividend rate of 0.01%, and they shall be compulsorily converted to Equity Shares at the ratio of 1:1 during a period not exceeding 12 months from the date of allotment or submission of RHP to SEBI, whichever is earlier.

EGM Logistics Information:

​India Exposition Mart Limited (IEML) operates a large exhibition and convention facility in Greater Noida, built across 57 acres. Its core asset comprises 17 exhibition halls, around 88,509 sq. m. of indoor space and another 78,511 sq. m. of outdoor space. The company monetizes this single physical complex through multiple complementary businesses, making it more than a conventional venue-rental company.

Six revenue engines

IEML generates revenue through third-party events, hospitality, its own exhibitions, managed events, maintenance services and its B2B digital platform, ExpoBazaar. Third-party events remain the backbone, contributing 56.44% of FY26 revenue. The company leases exhibition space to organizers and additionally earns from services such as security, housekeeping, food and beverages, medical facilities and IT support. Its recurring event calendar also provides a degree of revenue visibility.

The model is attractive because IEML can extract additional value from the same underlying asset. Its 136-room ExpoInn hotel, leased and managed hospitality properties, cafés, permanent showrooms and ExpoBazaar platform provide revenue even when exhibitions are not taking place.

Revenue growth is strong, but event volumes are falling

Revenue increased from ₹194.73 crore in FY24 to ₹290.63 crore in FY26, implying a strong growth trajectory. However, the number of events declined from 61 to 44 over the same period.

​

The divergence between revenue and event count suggests that IEML is generating more revenue per event rather than simply hosting more events. That can be positive if larger exhibitions are replacing smaller ones, but it also highlights a structural limitation: the company has a finite number of halls and operating days. Future growth therefore has to come from higher revenue per event or from businesses beyond its core venue.

FY26 exposes the cost of expansion

The biggest concern is profitability. Revenue grew 20.52% in FY26, but PAT declined 19.4%, while EBITDA margin fell from 31.98% to 22.62%. The primary reason was a sharp increase in other expenses, particularly exhibition-related costs.

Fairs and exhibition expenses rose 66.93% to ₹102.03 crore. Setup costs increased significantly because FY26 included three IHGF editions compared with one in FY25. This partly reflects a calendar shift rather than a permanent increase in underlying activity.

A second issue was licence fees. These jumped from ₹0.16 crore to ₹16.35 crore as IEML held five events at external venues versus one previously. This is strategically important: when an event is held at IEML's own venue, the company benefits from owning the infrastructure; when it operates elsewhere, it must pay another venue owner.

Balance sheet and cash flow remain strengths

Despite the margin pressure, the balance sheet is relatively conservative. Borrowings declined from ₹23.27 crore in FY24 to just ₹0.60 crore in FY26. Meanwhile, capital work-in-progress rose sharply to ₹56.27 crore, indicating investment in additional capacity. Trade receivables also increased 55% to ₹47.22 crore, faster than revenue growth.

Cash generation provides another positive signal. Operating cash flow increased from ₹38.56 crore to ₹52.84 crore in FY26 even as reported profit declined. However, capex rose dramatically to ₹62.28 crore, meaning investment requirements are beginning to absorb a significant portion of internally generated cash.

Where does the IPO money goes?

The fresh issue is primarily intended to upgrade the existing facility, including air-handling units, chillers, cooling towers, lifts and escalators, while also renovating Halls 4 and 6 and developing Hall 18. A major portion of the expenditure is scheduled for FY29.

Beyond the existing venue, management is pursuing an asset-light expansion strategy. This includes a proposed 35% stake in a Mohali convention-center SPV, expansion of its own event IPs, scaling ExpoBazaar and adding hospitality properties. However, several of these initiatives remain early-stage and some hotel concepts currently exist only as trademarks.

Investment takeaway

IEML offers exposure to India's expanding MICE ecosystem, but the investment case is more nuanced than simply betting on exhibition-industry growth. The company has a strong physical asset, multiple monetization channels, low leverage and healthy operating cash generation. At the same time, its expansion strategy is gradually moving away from its highest-margin advantage owning the venue.

The central question for investors is therefore not whether IEML can grow revenue, it clearly can but whether it can expand beyond its physical venue without permanently sacrificing the attractive economics of its core business. FY26 provides the first warning sign that growth may increasingly require accepting lower margins in exchange for a larger addressable market.

India's largest stock exchange has crossed a critical milestone in its nearly decade-long path to a public listing. The National Stock Exchange has received a No-Objection Certificate from SEBI, confirmed by NSE CEO Ashishkumar Chauhan, clearing the way for its Draft Red Herring Prospectus to move through final regulatory review.

The Decade-Long Road

NSE's IPO journey has been anything but straightforward. The exchange first filed its draft prospectus back in December 2016, but the process stalled for years amid regulatory scrutiny over preferential access to its algorithmic trading platform — the co-location controversy that would go on to define nearly a decade of delay. Multiple attempts to secure SEBI's no-objection certificate followed — in 2019, twice in 2020, and again in 2024 — each running into unresolved governance concerns.

The breakthrough came this year. SEBI decoupled the ongoing co-location settlement from the IPO approval process, allowing NSE to move forward on its listing while the legacy matter was resolved in parallel. NSE has since fully settled the case, paying a total of ₹1,491.21 crore to close out the last major legal overhang on the exchange.

Where Things Stand Today

NSE filed its DRHP with SEBI on June 17, 2026, and global investor roadshows began a month later across financial hubs including Boston, New York, San Francisco, London, Singapore, and Hong Kong, with roughly 120 large institutional investors engaged — including BlackRock, Capital Group, GQG Partners, Janus Henderson, and Allspring Global Investments. NSE has appointed 20 investment banks to manage the issue, among them Kotak Mahindra Capital, JM Financial, Morgan Stanley, HSBC, and Citigroup.

While the NOC is in hand, SEBI's final DRHP approval is still awaited — reportedly expected within the next two weeks. The approval timeline shifted after SBI Capital Markets was added to the list of selling shareholders, a change that triggered a fresh 21-day public feedback period on the offer documents.

The issue itself is structured entirely as an Offer for Sale — up to 14.89 crore shares, roughly 6% of NSE's paid-up equity, sold by existing shareholders. As an OFS, proceeds go to the selling shareholders rather than to NSE, and the share count stays fixed, so there is no dilution.

The Valuation Question

NSE is reportedly targeting a valuation of ₹5.2–5.3 lakh crore, with a potential price band of ₹2,100–2,300 per share. At the upper end, a 6% stake sale could raise close to ₹31,500 crore — which would make this India's largest-ever IPO, surpassing Hyundai Motor India's ₹27,870 crore issue.

Working off NSE's reported PAT of ₹10,302 Cr and 247.5 crore outstanding shares, here's how the implied valuation moves across a range of P/E multiples:

Since the issue is entirely an OFS, the share count stays fixed, making implied per-share values directly comparable across the multiple range. Notably, the reported target price band of ₹2,100–2,300 sits right around the 50x–55x mark — implying the market is pricing NSE close to BSE's current P/E of roughly 50x, rather than at a premium or discount to India's only other listed exchange.

The Bigger Picture

At its targeted valuation, NSE would rank around 6th globally among listed exchange operators by market value — a striking marker for an institution that spent nine years working through a single regulatory approval. With the DRHP decision now the final gate before pricing, the coming two weeks will determine whether NSE's September listing timeline holds.

Financial Performance (FY26 Numbers):

The total revenue of Sun Drops Energia Limited was at ₹586.0 crore in FY26, registering a healthy increase of around 58.8% YoY as compared to ₹369.0 crore in FY25 (and a massive exponential growth from ₹4.79 crore in FY22). Turnkey EPC for CPP and utility-scale commercial solar make up the majority of revenue, along with growing annuity-based Independent Power Producers (IPP). The Net Profit (PAT) is ₹97.0 crore with Net Profit Margin at 16.55%, witnessing an increase of ~89.1% YoY from ₹51.3 crore in FY25. With the help of its increasing order book and IPO, the valuation of unlisted equity of Sun Drops Energia was about ₹1,995 crore (ranging from ₹230 per share).

Operational Metrics:

The company Sun Drops Energia works on an integrated "IPP + CPP Turnkey EPC" business model which enables the company to cover the entire life cycle of projects starting from acquisition of land, engineering and power evacuation infrastructure to procurement, commissioning and maintenance. The company has a clean and healthy balance sheet structure with the Debt to Equity ratio of only 0.16x for FY25, which signifies low leverage and absence of dependence on external financing even with fast pace of asset creation. Sound financial control is evident with the help of an Interest Coverage ratio of 15.68x (FY25) and a Current ratio of 3.36x (FY25), thereby leaving sufficient margin for working capital. The operating leverage is a result of standard engineering templates and centralized module procurement in the KP group environment.

Key Project Executions & Order Book:

It has developed a solid execution history in the areas of utility-scale solar and industrial microgrids, which entails developing and commissioning several interconnected grid-scale solar projects in high-irradiance belts of Gujarat and Maharashtra states under the framework of the Distributed Renewable Energy Bilateral Purchase (DREBP). It has quickly established itself as one of the major market leaders in the storage category by winning 565 MW / 1,130 MWh BESS standalone projects from Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (GUVNL), which include 445 MW / 890 MWh project award and 120 MW / 240 MWh BESS Purchase Agreement (BESPA). Abroad, Sun Drops is developing solar and battery energy storage solution with the Fabtech Group and F+ Healthcare Technologies in UAE.

Strategic Developments & Outlook:

Sun Drops Energia is an incorporated firm established in Surat, Gujarat, in May 2019 and serving as one of the major subsidiaries of KPI Green Energy Limited. Sun Drops Energia is specially selected to act as the dedicated arm of the KP Group to develop utility BESS and clean energy hybrid systems. Currently, the firm is gearing up to go for its own independent Initial Public Offering (IPO) in FY27. Given that India is looking at 500 GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030 and the mandatory inclusion of RTC renewable energy, Sun Drops Energia is one of the early players in the utility-scale BESS space.

Deal Structure and Capital Infusion

Inox Clean Energy Ltd., the renewable and clean energy platform of the INOXGFL Group, has raised a major ₹1,500 crore financing package from the Motilal Oswal Group via its alternative investments segment, MO Alternates. The deal has been executed in the form of Compulsorily Convertible Debentures (CCDs), providing a dual private credit structure that provides downside yield coverage with equity gains on listing. In terms of the arrangement, ₹1,000 crore has been raised upfront, whereas the rest of the ₹500 crore will be invested in future milestone-based tranches. The current funding round is an integral component of the firm's plan to prepare itself for an IPO in the coming 12 to 24 months.

Strategic Allocation and Capacity Expansion

The new investments will be deployed to fund organic capital expenditure and business acquisitions within Inox Clean Energy’s IPP business and solar equipment manufacturing segments. Regarding power generation, through Inox Neo Energies, Inox Clean Energy currently has a portfolio of about 3 GW and has set a target of increasing its portfolio to more than 6 GW by FY27, along with expanding into international markets such as Zimbabwe. At the same time, the investment will be utilized to fund its solar equipment manufacturing subsidiary, Inox Solar, which already has 3 GW of module manufacturing capability in Gujarat and an integrated 5 GW cell and module manufacturing facility under construction, apart from US-based manufacturing capabilities.

Institutional Backing and Valuation Momentum

​

1. The Headline Numbers (Consolidated)

No exceptional items, one-off gains, or provision reversals sit in these numbers — the 34.9% PAT growth is a clean, operating-driven figure.

2. Where the Revenue Growth Actually Came From

*Off a very small base.

Fees & commission — the core, recurring AMC fee income — is doing almost all the heavy lifting, growing faster (38.0%) than total revenue (32.8%). The fair-value gains line, which is more market-dependent and lumpier, grew much slower. That's a healthier growth mix than if the reverse were true.

3. Cost Side — Expenses Are Growing, But Revenue Is Outrunning Them

*Off a small base.

Employee costs (the biggest line) grew roughly in step with revenue, but "other expenses" — the catch-all operating cost bucket — barely moved (+1.9%). That's the main reason cost-to-income improved to 12.6% from 13.4%.

4. Tax Line

Current tax rose sharply, +53.6% (₹39.0 cr vs ₹25.4 cr), faster than profit growth. This was partly offset by a deferred tax credit of ₹0.30 cr this quarter vs a deferred tax charge of ₹4.13 cr a year ago, so net tax expense grew a more moderate 31.2% (₹38.7 cr vs ₹29.5 cr).

5. Below-the-Line / Notes Worth Knowing

• New subsidiary, fresh capital: PPFAS Asset Management Pvt Ltd incorporated a new wholly-owned subsidiary, PPFAS Pension Fund Managers Pvt Ltd, on 8 May 2026, and infused ₹60 crore of equity into it on 15 May 2026. It hasn't started full-scale operations yet, so no material P&L impact this quarter — but it's a capital commitment to a new business line.

• Unreviewed subsidiaries: Three smaller subsidiaries (PPFAS Alternate Asset Managers IFSC, PPFAS Trustee Company, PPFAS Pension Fund Managers) weren't directly reviewed by the auditor — their numbers rest on management certification. Combined, they contributed ₹1.39 cr of revenue and a net loss of ₹0.37 cr for the quarter, rolled into the consolidated figures.

• Dividend signal: The board has recommended ₹25/share for FY26, up from ₹15/share paid for FY25 — a 67% step-up, subject to shareholder approval at the AGM.

6. Standalone vs Consolidated

The gap is stark: consolidated PAT of ₹131.4 crore vs standalone PAT of just ₹3.09 crore. Parag Parikh Financial Advisory Services Ltd is essentially a holding company; almost all the fee-earning business (managing PPFAS Mutual Fund) sits inside its subsidiary, PPFAS Asset Management Pvt Ltd. The parent's standalone income is mostly portfolio management fees plus whatever dividend it receives from the subsidiary — and dividends are lumpy, not quarterly. In Q4 FY26 the parent received ₹25.01 crore in dividend income from PPFAS AMC (₹7/share), pushing that one quarter's standalone PAT up sharply. No such dividend landed in Q1 FY27, so standalone profit reverts to its normal, much smaller run-rate.

Anyone valuing PPFAS off standalone numbers alone will get a misleading picture — the consolidated numbers are the ones that reflect the actual business.

7. How This Stacks Up Against Peer AMCs (Q1 FY27, YoY)

PPFAS is the smallest of the four in absolute profit, but it's outgrowing all three listed peers on both revenue and profit — and it's doing so with a leaner cost structure (12.6% cost-to-income, among the tightest in the industry). For a business still building scale, that combination of high growth plus expanding margins is the more interesting story than the absolute size gap.

​

How the Share-Swap Deal Works

Shalimar Paints is set for a major transformation after its board approved a proposal to invest in its parent company, Hella Infra Market, which operates the Infra.Market building materials platform. The unusual part is that Shalimar will not pay cash for the investment. Instead, it will issue a large number of its own shares and compulsorily convertible preference shares (CCPS) to shareholders of Hella Infra Market.

In simple terms, Infra.Market is using Shalimar Paints, an already-listed company, as a route to the public markets. Under the proposed share-swap arrangement, shareholders of Hella Infra Market will hand over their shares and CCPS and receive newly issued securities of Shalimar Paints in return. After the transaction, Hella Infra Market could become an unlisted material subsidiary of Shalimar Paints, subject to shareholder and regulatory approvals.

This is why the transaction is being described as a potential reverse merger or backdoor listing. Instead of Infra.Market going through a conventional IPO, its shareholders could become major shareholders of the listed Shalimar Paints. If completed, the much larger building-materials business could effectively become the main operating business within the listed entity.

Deal Numbers

As part of the proposed non-cash share swap, Shalimar Paints plans to issue up to 41.70 crore equity shares worth ₹3,544.69 crore and 81.12 crore CCPS worth ₹6,895.22 crore, both priced at ₹85 per security. Together, the proposed swap securities are valued at around ₹10,440 crore.

Separately, Shalimar Paints has proposed a ₹1,000 crore QIP to raise fresh cash from institutional investors. It has also proposed a smaller preferential issue of around ₹105.86 crore to three investors.

The transaction would significantly increase Shalimar's share count and dilute existing shareholders. The exact impact will depend on the final swap ratio and the conversion terms of the CCPS.

What About Infra.Market's Valuation?

The ₹10,440 crore figure should not be treated as the valuation of the entire Infra.Market business. It represents the proposed consideration for the securities being exchanged in this transaction.

Infra.Market was last valued at around ₹24,000-25,000 crore in private-market fundraising. The proposed transaction therefore appears broadly consistent with that valuation, although the final swap ratio will be based on valuation reports and remains subject to approvals.

The board has also discussed the possibility of unifying Shalimar Paints and Hella Infra Market at a later stage, although no formal merger has been completed yet. For now, the key development is the proposed share swap, which could give Infra.Market a route to the stock market without a conventional IPO.

Indian Potash Limited (IPL) operates as one of India's largest fertiliser importers and distributors, with its core business centered on sourcing and marketing Muriate of Potash, Di-Ammonium Phosphate, Sulphate of Potash, and Urea across the country - including remote and inaccessible regions - through an extensive network of Regional offices covering nearly every State capital. Its distribution model leans heavily on India's agricultural cooperative structure and direct farmer engagement, backed by nationwide farmer education initiatives, product literacy campaigns, and sales outreach programs run in multiple regional languages. Beyond its fertiliser trading and distribution mandate, IPL has diversified into allied agri and consumer businesses, including manufacturing of Cattle feed products, Milk and milk products, Sulphitation and refined Sugar, Distillery operations, and trading in Gold and other precious metals - giving the company a multi-segment revenue base anchored around, but not limited to, its position in India's fertiliser supply chain. The Company, incorporated and headquartered in Chennai, Tamil Nadu, also plays a quasi-strategic role in the sector given its past mandate for global tender-based procurement of key fertilisers on behalf of the industry, reflecting close alignment with government food-security and farmer-welfare objectives.

1. Revenue, EBITDA, Net Profit & EPS Summary (Rs in Cr)
​

Revenue surged ~57.6% YoY, driven largely by the trading (purchases of stock-in-trade) line rather than in-house manufacturing. Operating EBITDA grew more slowly at ~50.5%, and margin actually compressed slightly, as finance costs rose sharply alongside a much larger trading book. Consolidated net profit grew a more modest ~19.3%, diluting the consolidated margin even as absolute profit rose. EPS growth mirrors NP growth since the share count was unchanged.

2. Common-Size Statement 

Cost of goods sold (materials consumed + trading purchases, net of inventory movement) rose from ~83.3% to ~85.0% of revenue - the trading business scaled with a slightly thinner gross spread, largely because the mix shifted further toward lower-margin purchases of stock-in-trade (fertiliser trading) versus in-house materials consumption. Finance costs jumped from ~2.4% to ~3.6% of revenue, reflecting the much larger working-capital borrowings needed to fund the bigger trading book. Employee costs and other expenses improved slightly as a share of revenue, showing some operating cost leverage even as gross margin narrowed.

3. Key Balance Sheet Items (Rs in Cr)

4. Key Ratio Analysis

Net Profit Margin fell as consolidated profit grew more slowly than revenue. ROE held roughly steady (~14.5-14.7%) as equity grew broadly in line with profit, aided by strong retained earnings. Fixed asset turnover jumped sharply (~13.6x to ~17.7x), reflecting that revenue growth was driven almost entirely by trading volumes rather than fresh capex on plant and equipment. The Debt-to-Equity ratio nearly doubled (0.46x to 0.76x), the clearest signal that the FY26 growth was financed substantially through incremental borrowings, consistent with the working capital.

​

For GalaxEye, Mission Drishti was supposed to be the moment when years of development translated into a working satellite in orbit. Instead, the Bengaluru-based space-tech startup lost communication with the spacecraft within weeks of its launch, leaving its core technology waiting for another chance to prove itself.

A different approach to Earth observation

Founded in 2021 by five IIT Madras alumni, GalaxEye is developing OptoSAR, a satellite technology that combines optical imaging with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). Optical cameras produce familiar, high-quality images but can be affected by clouds and darkness. SAR uses microwave signals and can operate through clouds and at night, although its imagery is more difficult to interpret.

GalaxEye's idea is to combine both technologies on the same satellite and fuse the resulting data. The company plans to use this capability for applications including defence, agriculture, infrastructure, insurance and disaster management.

Mission Drishti changes the story

On 3 May 2026, GalaxEye launched Mission Drishti aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9. The approximately 190-kg satellite represented a major milestone for the company and was designed to demonstrate its OptoSAR technology in orbit. However, during the satellite's early orbital phase, a severe geomagnetic solar storm affected the spacecraft. According to GalaxEye's initial root-cause analysis, radiation from the storm likely damaged a critical onboard subsystem. Communication with Drishti became intermittent and eventually stopped. On 7 July, the company said the chances of recovering the satellite were low.

The failure does not necessarily mean OptoSAR itself did not work. The bigger problem is that the mission ended before GalaxEye could fully demonstrate the technology and generate commercially useful imagery.

GalaxEye responds with StarOps

Rather than abandoning its approach, GalaxEye has moved to strengthen its spacecraft capabilities. On 10 August 2026, the company announced the acquisition of StarOps, a Bengaluru-based spacecraft engineering company with roots in TeamIndus. StarOps brings expertise in propulsion, avionics, flight computing, guidance and navigation, structures and mission operations. It has also developed satellite bus platforms in the 50 kg, 150 kg and 250 kg categories, with more than 66% indigenisation.

The acquisition is significant because the satellite's payload is only one part of the system. Power, communications, computing, navigation and thermal systems are equally important for keeping the payload operational. GalaxEye has said it plans to build two new OptoSAR satellites within 24 months.

The valuation question

GalaxEye has reportedly raised around ₹212 crore since inception, while its latest funding rounds implied a valuation of approximately ₹489 crore. The company also raised around ₹93 crore during 2026, including a ₹49.29 crore allotment in June. For investors, however, the important question is the price being paid today. The source notes that GalaxEye shares have reportedly traded in the unlisted market at around three times the latest primary valuation. That means investors are potentially paying a significant premium before the company's technology has been fully proven in orbit.

What happens next?

GalaxEye now faces a clear sequence of milestones: build the next satellite, successfully launch and commission it, demonstrate OptoSAR's capabilities and convert the resulting data into commercial contracts. The StarOps acquisition may strengthen the company's engineering capabilities, but it cannot eliminate execution risk. For GalaxEye, the next satellite will therefore be more than another mission. It will be the company's next opportunity to move from technological promise to technological proof.

Garuda Aerospace is an Indian drone technology company that designs, manufactures and operates drones across agriculture, defence, surveillance, infrastructure and industrial applications. Founded in 2015, the company has expanded from agricultural drone solutions into higher-value defence and industrial applications. It is also moving towards the public markets, having received SEBI’s final observation for its proposed IPO on 5 August 2026, bringing the company closer to a potential listing.

Business Model

Garuda follows an integrated model covering drone manufacturing, Drone-as-a-Service (DaaS) and pilot training. It manufactures drones and also provides drone-based services to customers that do not want to own the equipment. Its applications range from agricultural spraying and mapping to defence surveillance, inspection and logistics.

Its portfolio has increasingly shifted beyond agriculture towards defence and industrial drones, including surveillance, swarm and cargo-delivery platforms.

Financial Performance

IPO: Issue Size and Use of Funds

Garuda Aerospace had confidentially filed for a proposed ₹1,000 crore IPO in April 2026. The issue structure reported at the time consisted of a ₹750 crore fresh issue and ₹250 crore OFS. Following SEBI approval in August 2026, reports indicate the fresh issue component could be up to ₹750 crore, with the final issue structure and price band to be announced later.

Object of the fresh issue:

• Research & Development for advanced drone technologies.
• Expansion of manufacturing capabilities and facilities.
• Development of new drone platforms and related technology.

Key Investors

• Venture Catalysts – Invested ₹100 crore in Series B funding in April 2025 at a reported $250 million valuation.
• Narotam Sekhsaria Family Office – Led a $1 million funding round in June 2025.
• We Founder Circle – Participated in the June 2025 funding round.
• MS Dhoni – Strategic investor and prominent backer of the company.

Recent Strategic Moves

Garuda has been accelerating its move into defence drones. In August 2025, it inaugurated a dedicated defence drone facility in Chennai and launched five new UAV platforms aimed at battlefield and disaster-response applications.

The company has also been increasing production capacity and R&D spending, with the June 2025 funding round intended to take annual production from around 8,000 drones to 12,000–15,000 units and expand its international presence.

Conclusion

Garuda Aerospace is transitioning from an agriculture-focused drone company into a broader defence and industrial drone technology player. Its profitability, growing manufacturing capabilities and upcoming IPO provide a platform for expansion, while the increasing focus on defence applications could become an important growth driver going forward.

​Madhur Iron and Steel is in the business of manufacturing and trading of a wide range of structural steel products, including Angles, Channels, Mild Steel (MS) Sections, and Flats & Rods. The Company primarily operates under a business-to-business (B2B), order-based model, supplying products to institutional customers. The Company is engaged in the manufacture of re-rolled structural steel products, including Angles, Channels and other similar products. Upon manufacture, such structural steel products are either sold directly to customers or, depending on customer specifications, further processed through fabrication to convert them into finished, application ready products. Its products cater to diverse end-use industries, such as railway electrification, state electricity boards, power and energy infrastructure, telecom tower manufacturing, automotive and ancillary units, offshore structure fabrication, construction and real estate, general engineering, auto body manufacturing, and other related industries.

​1. Revenue, EBITDA, Net Profit & EPS Summary (₹in Cr)

Revenue grew 301% YoY, and EBITDA grew faster, pointing to modest operating leverage. Net profit rose 32%, slightly ahead of revenue growth, while EPS grew a slower 19% because the equity share capital base itself nearly doubled during the year. Company has issued 1,48,92,273 bonus shares in FY26.

2. Common-Size Statement

​​

3. Key Balance Sheet Items

4. Key Ratio Analysis

ROE improved as profit growth (32%) outpaced the 26% growth in the equity base from retained earnings and bonus issue. The Debt-to-Equity ratio rose as borrowings were drawn up faster than equity to fund working capital requirements. Fixed asset turnover improved, consistent with revenue growing faster than the property, plant and equipment base.

1. Business Overview

​Goodluck Defence and Aerospace Ltd. (GDAL), a subsidiary of Goodluck India Ltd., is expanding its presence in India's defence manufacturing sector. The company was established in 2023 and operates a facility in Sikandrabad, Uttar Pradesh, where it manufactures 155mm artillery shell bodies. Unlike complete ammunition manufacturers, GDAL focuses on the forged-steel shell body, while explosive filling and fuzes are handled separately. The company's facility has received the required defence manufacturing approvals and quality certification.

The business is benefiting from rising global demand for artillery ammunition following the Russia-Ukraine conflict and increased defence spending across several countries. GDAL currently has an annual capacity of around 1.5 lakh shells and plans to increase this to 4 lakh shells, supported by a planned expansion. The company has also secured a domestic order of around ₹255 crore for 155mm long-range empty shells, strengthening visibility for the business.

2. Business Performance

GDAL generated ₹46 crore of revenue and ₹29 crore of EBITDA in FY26, translating into an EBITDA margin of around 63%. However, management has cautioned that this unusually high margin is not sustainable because the plant was operational for only part of the year. It expects a more normalised EBITDA margin of around 30–35% as production scales up.

For FY27, management has guided for ₹250–300 crore of revenue from the defence business, with the existing capacity expected to operate at around 75–80% utilisation. This would represent more than five times FY26 revenue at the lower end of the guidance. To support longer-term growth, GDAL's board on August 6, 2026, approved a proposal to raise ₹283.5 crore through the issue of up to 75.6 lakh shares at ₹375 each to 38 non-promoter investors. The proceeds will be used mainly for capacity expansion, working capital and general corporate purposes.

The company plans to invest around ₹400 crore in expansion, taking annual shell-making capacity from 1.5 lakh to 4 lakh units. The fundraise therefore comes at a crucial stage as GDAL attempts to convert strong current demand into a much larger defence business.

3. Conclusion

Goodluck Defence is rapidly transforming Goodluck India's traditional engineering capabilities into a high-growth defence business. Strong artillery demand, a sizeable order pipeline and planned capacity expansion provide significant growth potential. However, the company still needs to prove that it can achieve its FY27 revenue guidance and sustain the targeted 30–35% EBITDA margin as operations mature.

At the end of FY26, Transline had ₹13 lakh in the bank, not ₹13 crore! In the same fiscal year, it had made a profit after tax of ₹70.28 crore on revenues of ₹488.46 crore, registering a growth of 32%. Both the statements are correct, and both point to the reason why the company is planning an IPO.

The Business
​

Transline builds and runs security and identity infrastructure for institutions that can't afford failure - cameras, biometrics and AI for police stations, railways and smart cities, delivered as one accountable contract rather than four separate vendors. Incorporated in 2001, the company has spent 25 years working its way into some of the most sensitive corners of Indian public infrastructure: Aadhaar enrolment for UIDAI, biometric attendance systems for a state judiciary, and large-scale deployments across PSUs, Railways and Police departments, serving 250+ clients through 8+ proprietary platforms.

The Revenue Mix
​

In the revenue profile, the truth comes out. The solutions business, which includes hardware and integration, accounts for 77% of the revenues but only 26% of the segment profit, at a meagre margin of 9.2%. While the services business contributes only 23% of the revenues, it accounts for 74% of the profits and is growingalmost twiceas fast.

This is a structural problem, not one of accounting trickery. In FY25 and FY26, the company has made a profit of ₹118.6 crore while burning through ₹87 crore in operational cash, resulting in a difference of ₹200 crore. The amount of unbilled revenue, receivables, retention of money, and inventory has come toapproximately equala year's worth of sales at the top line. This has resulted in growth which has been external, via borrowings, capital raise in FY25, and now a DRHP approved by SEBI in January 2026.

The Valuation Question

At an indicative price of ₹168 a share, the stock is trading at 21x FY26 earnings —not unreasonable at 45% profit growth, but the market is paying for accounting profit without generating cash yet. If the company can bridge the gap in the form of billed and collected milestones or if the company is unable to bridge it via raising more capital, then we will know it from FY27 cash flow.

Madhur Iron & Steel (India) Limited is preparing to enter the capital markets with its proposed Mainboard IPO. The company filed its Draft Red Herring Prospectus (DRHP) with SEBI on January 23, 2026, with the filing subsequently published by SEBI on February 6, 2026. The proposed IPO comprises a fresh issue of up to 1 crore equity shares, with no Offer for Sale component.

Business Model

Company is engaged in the manufacturing and trading of a wide range of structural steel products, including Angles, Channels, Mild Steel (MS) Sections, and Flats & Rods. The Company primarily operates under a business-to-business (B2B), order-based model, supplying products to institutional customers. The Company is engaged in the manufacture of re-rolled structural steel products, including Angles, Channels and other similar products. Upon manufacture, such structural steel products are either sold directly to customers or, depending on customer specifications, further processed through fabrication to convert them into finished, application ready products. Its products cater to diverse end-use industries, such as railway electrification, state electricity boards, power and energy infrastructure, telecom tower manufacturing, automotive and ancillary units, offshore structure fabrication, construction and real estate, general engineering, auto body manufacturing, and other related industries.

Product Portfolio

1.  Structural Steel Products - Angles, channel, section flats and roads
2. Engineered Products- Transmission Line Towers, 
3. Trading of steel products like billets, blooms, and plates.

Object of the Issue

1. Repayment/ prepayment, in full or in part, of certain borrowings and accrued interest thereon availed by the Company
2.  Financing the capital expenditure requirements. 
3. Funding for working capital requirements and General Corporate purposes.

Financial Performance

Key Performance Indicator