<p style="text-align: justify">​<br></p><p style="text-align: justify">The Indian D2C industry has blossomed from startups using Instagram as their platform to an industry worth several lakh crores annually across beauty, fashion, food, electronics and home goods. As such businesses become more successful and mature, a parallel industry has developed around them; one of selling unlisted shares (shares before the IPO). Early employees, angel investors and venture capital firms selling their shares in the unlisted share market in anticipation of going public through NSE/BSE.<br>This piece will explore what unlisted shares are, why D2C businesses dominate this market, and list the D2C businesses that are currently trading in the OTC (Over The Counter) Pre-IPO share market in India.<br></p><h2 style="text-align: justify">Why D2C Brands Dominate the Unlisted Market</h2><p style="text-align: justify">​<a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/unlisted-shares/">Unlisted shares</a> are particularly common for India's direct-to-consumer (D2C) brands, and there is a very obvious reason why that is the case: because most D2C startups have used the same business strategy bootstrap or seed money, scale up quickly through Instagram, YouTube, and quick commerce, get a few venture rounds in, grow to several hundred or a couple of thousand crore revenues and then either look for an IPO or a strategic exit. The period between when a company is labeled as a unicorn and before it goes public, is precisely the period where the trading of unlisted shares really takes off. India's own D2C market grew very rapidly as well from a few thousand crore in the later 2010s to tens of thousands of crore annually in 2026.</p><h2 style="text-align: justify">Top D2C Brands Currently Trading in the Unlisted Market</h2><p style="text-align: justify">With the growth of their offline presence, many D2C leaders who are approaching profitability have witnessed a rising demand for their shares prior to an IPO listing. The unlisted share market is a fascinating way of looking at these exciting consumer stories before their IPO listings.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify">1. BoAt (Imagine Marketing Limited)</h3><p style="text-align: justify">​<a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/boat-imagine-marketing/">BoAt</a> – the audio and wearables brand established by Aman Gupta and Sameer Mehta in 2013-14 – is the most active D2C brand in the unlisted markets of India. It had filed for its IPO in January 2022, having an initial size of about $300 million, then pulled back its IPO application amid deteriorating market conditions, and now has resubmitted an IPO application with a target issue size of about ₹1,500 crore (fresh issue + offer-for-sale). The parent company, Imagine Marketing, has taken investments from a group of investors that include Warburg Pincus, Qualcomm Ventures, Malabar Investments, Innoven Capital, and Fireside Ventures.<br><br>The stock price of boAt on the OTC markets has fluctuated greatly depending on the prevailing market sentiment; boAt began trading on OTC markets at ₹1,225 in 2022, dropped to about ₹700-740 when the IPO was postponed amid unfavorable conditions in the market, recovered to above ₹1,200-1,600 through 2023-24 owing to rumors of upcoming IPO, and now trades in the range of ₹840-890 as of June 2026 (with the implied market capitalization of around ₹11,500-11,700 crore), following the recent SEBI observations on the fresh IPO application of boAt.<br></p><h3 style="text-align: justify">2. Licious (Delightful Gourmet Private Limited)</h3><p style="text-align: justify">Licious is India’s biggest D2C meat and seafood brand company, and it has been one of the earliest unicorns in the industry. For 2026, Licious' founders announced that an IPO would be launched only in 2027-28, since they wish to become sustainable before launching an IPO and not based on growth momentum. Since Licious hasn’t submitted any IPO paperwork, liquidity in their unlisted stock will be lower compared to boAt's, and prices will be mostly based on their last funding round and not secondary trades, which several unlisted stock exchanges quote.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify"><strong>3. WOW Skin Science (Body Cupid Private Limited)</strong></h3><p style="text-align: justify">Amongst India’s leading “clean beauty” personal care brands selling directly to consumers (D2C), WOW Skin Science (a brand of Body Cupid Pvt Ltd) achieved a valuation of up to $280 million in 2022, thanks to investment from GIC and ChrysCapital. The company has had an inconsistent track record – revenue fell from ₹258 crore in FY23 to ₹233 crore in FY24, but net losses shrank substantially (from ₹213 crore to ₹130 crore). Media reports up until 2025 suggested that the firm was in talks to raise new capital at an enterprise value of $400 million, as well as having a strategic sale process under consideration at a significantly lower enterprise value of $250 million. Unlike boAt, WOW Skin Science has not built a liquid market for its unlisted shares – its unlisted status currently stems from being privately held and engaged in periodic secondary share transactions.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify">4. Country Delight (Behemoth Agri Services Private Limited)</h3><p style="text-align: justify">This milk and grocery delivery business to households is scaling fast, with a FY24 revenue of ₹1,380 crore (up 46% Y-o-Y) that has been fuelled by investments from Temasek, Elevation Capital and Venturi Partners. The company has publicly discussed IPO plans and raised money pre-IPO through equity and debt financing up to FY25-26, though the firm hasn’t filed its DRHP as of mid-FY26. The stock of the company is available on some unlisted/pre-IPO exchanges (even in foreign markets for global investors), though activity on those is less than boAt’s.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify">5. GIVA (Jewellery)</h3><p style="text-align: justify">Rapidly growing GIVA, which offers jewellery digitally first, announced in 2026 that it raised a sizable ₹530 crore funding round as one of many D2C brands getting investment in the jewellery and beauty categories. GIVA is still a private company, though there are some international platforms offering to buy shares of the company even before an IPO.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify"><strong>6. Snitch (Fashion)</strong></h3><p style="text-align: justify">This men’s fashion D2C brand, famous for its quick design-to-store turnaround, raised around $40 million during its funding round in 2026. The company is still private and has no plans for going public in the coming years, making it more of an “interesting name” than an active stock.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify">7. Other Private D2C names on investors' radar</h3><p style="text-align: justify">Many other privately-held D2C companies operating on a scaled basis may attract more attention in terms of buying unlisted stocks before going public or making a sale. Examples include Mokobara (travel &amp; luggage), The Whole Truth (clean-label food), Farmley &amp; Foxtale (snacks &amp; skincare, both have received a lot of money lately), and Supertails (pet care). However, there is little interest in these firms on OTC marketplaces unless the company decides to go for an IPO or raise large amounts of money in late-stage venture financing.</p><h2 style="text-align: justify">D2C Brands That Have Recently Moved From "Unlisted" to "Listed"</h2><p style="text-align: justify">Worth noting here is that there are a few D2C brands that had the term 'unlisted shares' associated with them but have gone on to do their IPO already – giving us a good sense of how fluid this list can be:<br></p><ul><li><strong>Honasa Consumer</strong> (<a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/mamaearth-honasa-consumer/">Mamaearth</a>, The Derma Co, Aqualogica) - Listed through IPO in 2023, and still India's biggest listed pure-play D2C FMCG business.<br></li><li><strong>Lenskart Solutions -</strong> This eyewear behemoth raised close to ₹7,279 crore through its IPO and was listed on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/national-stock-exchange/">NSE</a>/BSE on November 10, 2025, when its unlisted shares were trading in the ₹400-₹413 range.<br></li><li><strong>Wakefit Innovations –</strong> This sleep and home-solutions brand that had been a regular presence on unlisted shares forums (tradable at ₹110-₹195 per share pre-listing) filed for a ₹468 crore issue through DRHP + Offer for Sale, did its pre-IPO placement with investors like DSP, 360 ONE among others, and got listed in December 2025 with a valuation of about Rs 6,300- Rs 6,400.</li><li><strong>BlueStone Jewellery &amp; Lifestyle </strong>is a jewellery brand based online and has offered an IPO worth ₹1,541 crores. The IPO was priced at ₹517 and was listed on the NSE/BSE on August 19, 2025. The issue price was at a slight discount due to the company’s losses and heavy dependence on working capital.</li></ul><p style="text-align: justify">In totality, the four companies provide an excellent example of the pipeline concept. Companies remain actively traded but unlisted for a few years, file DRHP, and then leave the unlisted market.</p><h2 style="text-align: justify"><strong>The Outlook</strong></h2><p style="text-align: justify">The "startup IPO" pipeline is still going strong for India leading up to 2027, with many new age companies either filing their DRHPs or set to do so. When it comes to D2C startups, there is no doubt that the future will see more and more profitable, well-funded scale players moving onto the bourses (Mamaearth, Lenskart, Wakefit, BlueStone), while boAt is the most advanced of those not yet listed; and Licious, Country Delight, GIVA and Snitch are in the process, with some preferring to put off listing till they become profitable since the attitude of investors in 2026 is profit and contribution margins over growth at any cost.</p>

India's own D2C market grew very rapidly as well from a few thousand crore in the later 2010s to tens of thousands of crore annually in 2026

Top D2C Brands With Unlisted Shares in India

<p><br>Transline Technologies has been developing one of the most convincing growth tales in India’s private equity market – although not in power transmission in the literal sense, but in the connection of India’s digital and physical security infrastructure. Now, having filed its DRHP and received its SEBI observation letter, it is ready to take off for its IPO. Here is what the figures say about the validity of the current entry price.</p><h2>What Does Transline Actually Do?</h2><p>​<a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/transline-technologies-ltd/">Transline Technologies</a> is an integrated solutions provider in video surveillance, biometrics, and IT infrastructure, offering services from hardware integration and installation to the provision of software solutions and warranty management. The company’s clientele is predominantly in sectors such as government, PSU, BFSI, health care, retail, and education, making its revenue streams less susceptible to consumer discretion and more secure and reliable.<br><br><strong>1. Founded: </strong>2001, headquartered in Delhi<br><br><strong>2. Core segments: </strong>Security &amp; surveillance systems, IT infrastructure integration, Electronics System Design &amp; Manufacturing (ESDM)<br><br><strong>3. Client base:</strong> 100+ major corporations including Fortune 500 clients, alongside government and PSU contracts<br><br><strong>4. IPO status:</strong> DRHP filed with SEBI on 7 August 2025; SEBI's observation letter received 23 January 2026<br><br>The broader backdrop matters here too. India has been pushing hard on domestic electronics manufacturing through PLI-linked incentives, and demand for surveillance systems, biometric access control, and secure IT infrastructure has grown steadily across smart city projects, banking security upgrades, and public safety programmes. Transline's ESDM arm, which covers everything from design to integration for sectors like automotive, industrial, and telecom, gives it a foothold in this manufacturing shift rather than leaving the business purely reliant on trading margins from imported hardware.</p><h2>The Growth Story: Revenue and Profitability</h2><p>Transline's FY25 revenues grew 64% year on year, driven by conversion of a strong FY24 order backlog (Rs 255 Cr). The growth rate of FY26 witnessed moderation but still remained impressive in the context of the scale of the business.</p><p><br></p><table class="se-table-size-100 se-table-layout-auto"><tbody><tr><td><div style="text-align: center"><strong>Metric (Rs Cr)</strong><br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center"><strong>FY25</strong><br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center"><strong>FY26</strong><br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center"><strong>Change</strong><br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">Revenue<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">371.08<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">488.46<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">+31.7%<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">EBITDA Margin<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">21.39%<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">22.36%<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">+0.98 %<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">PAT Margin<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">13.03%<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">14.39%<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">+1.36 %<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">Basic EPS (Rs)<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">5.44<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">7.84<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">+44%<br></div></td></tr></tbody></table><p><br>A few things stand out here:<br><br>Margin recovery, not just growth. EBITDA margin improved to 22.36% in FY26 after dipping from a FY24 peak of 23.14% to 21.39% in FY25 — the initial compression likely reflected mix dilution as the company absorbed a much larger, lower-margin project base during its 64% growth surge; FY26 shows better cost absorption as execution matured.<br><br>Bottom-line growth outpacing revenue. PAT margin expanded faster than EBITDA margin, suggesting operating leverage is starting to show through at the net level, not just at the operating line.<br><br>Government/PSU concentration. Roughly 66% of FY25 revenue came from government agencies, state departments, urban local bodies, and PSUs — a segment that offers revenue visibility and payment discipline, but also ties growth to public procurement cycles and budget timing.</p><h2>Balance Sheet and Return Ratios: A Mixed Picture</h2><p>Not every metric moved in the same direction, and that’s worth flagging rather than glossing over.<br><strong>​<br>1. Liquidity strengthened: </strong>Current ratio improved to 1.81x in FY26 from 1.73x in FY25, continuing a multi-year recovery from a 1.55x low in FY23 — a sign the company has built more working capital cushion even as revenue scaled more than 4x over the period.<br><br><strong>2. ROCE improved:</strong> Rising to 27.15% in FY26 from 25.77% in FY25, as EBIT grew faster (49% y-o-y) than capital employed — a genuinely encouraging capital-efficiency signal.<br><br><strong>3. ROE and ROA both softened: </strong>ROE fell to 32.87% from 36.86%, and ROA eased to 14.86% from 15.67%, as total assets and equity grew faster than net profit — largely a function of the balance sheet expanding (receivables, loans and advances) to support the higher revenue base rather than any operating weakness.<br><br><strong>4. Order book </strong>stood at Rs 198.6 Cr as of end- FY25 — smaller than the Rs 255 Cr FY24 figure, worth tracking as a forward growth indicator alongside quarterly execution updates.</p><h3>Key Takeaways</h3><p><strong>1. Revenue growth remains strong</strong> (31.7% in FY26) even as it moderates from FY25's exceptional 64% surge — a healthier, more sustainable trajectory.<br><br><strong>2. Margins are recovering,</strong> not deteriorating, with EBITDA and PAT margins both expanding in FY26 after FY25 dilution.<br><br><strong>3. Capital efficiency is improving </strong>(ROCE up), even as ROE/ROA softened on balance sheet growth — a distinction worth understanding rather than treating as a blanket red flag.<br><br><strong>4. DRHP is filed, and SEBI has responded -</strong> this is a live, advancing IPO candidate, not a speculative "maybe someday" story.<br><br><strong>5. ~66% government/PSU revenue concentration</strong> cuts both ways: strong revenue visibility, but exposure to public-sector budget and payment cycles.<br><br><strong>6. Price discovery </strong>is inconsistent across platforms - verify current quotes and lot sizes directly before transacting.<br><br>Transline is among the most fundamental stocks in this area, with an IPO timetable that is progressing nicely, improved margins, and an entrenched client base, dominated by the government. However, the extremely wide band on the unlisted price and declining ROE/ROA ratios merit further scrutiny before taking any position.<br></p>

Transline Technologies Unlisted Shares: Power Transmission Bet?

<p>​<br>BoAt has become one of the most familiar consumer electronics brands in India. Its earphones, headphones, speakers, and smartwatches are widely sold across online and offline channels.<br><br>The company grew fast when it first started. Things changed during the last few years. Revenue growth slowed down; boAt reported losses for two years in a row. Fy25 finally saw boAt return to profit.</p><p><br>At the same time, boAt's unlisted share price has fallen sharply from its earlier high. With the IPO now back in focus, the key question for investors is whether the current price of ₹852 per share offers a good entry point.</p><h2>BoAt's Financial Performance</h2><p>The latest consolidated numbers show a clear improvement in FY25.</p><p><br></p><table><tbody><tr><td><div style="text-align: center"><strong>₹ crore</strong><br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center"><strong>FY23</strong><br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center"><strong>FY24</strong><br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center"><strong>FY25</strong><br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">Revenue from operations<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">3,376.8<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">3,117.7<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">3,073.3<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">Profit / (Loss)<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">(129.5)<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">(79.7)<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">61.1<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">EPS (₹)​<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">(9.22)<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">(5.31)<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">4.07<br></div></td></tr></tbody></table><p><br>BoAt reported a consolidated loss of ₹129.5 crore in FY23. The loss reduced to ₹79.7 crore in FY24. In 2025, the company returned to profit and reported a consolidated profit after tax of six hundred eleven crore rupees.<br><br>However, revenue stayed basically the same at three thousand crore rupees.<br><br>This means FY25 was mainly a profitability turnaround rather than a growth turnaround.<br><br>The company benefited from better cost control, lower finance costs, and improved working capital management. Debt also reduced sharply compared with FY23, which reduced pressure on profits.​<br></p>

<h3>What Improved in FY25?</h3><p>The turnaround was not only visible in the final profit number.<br><br>1. The company moved from losses to profit.<br>2. EBITDA turned positive.<br>3. Finance costs declined.<br>4. Working capital management improved.<br>5. Inventory management became more efficient.​<br></p>

<h2>Where Does BoAt Stand in the Market?</h2><p>​<a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/boat-imagine-marketing/">BoAt's</a> biggest strength is its brand.<br><br>The company built its position by selling stylish products. The products mainly target consumers. The company has a presence on e-commerce platforms. The company has also expanded its distribution.<br><br>Audio remains the main part of the business. According to the company's IPO disclosures, audio contributed around ₹2,586 crore in FY25, while wearables contributed around ₹330 crore.<br>This shows an important change in the business.<br><br>Wearables were earlier seen as a major growth opportunity. But the smartwatch market has become more competitive, and growth has slowed. As a result, audio has become even more important for boAt.<br><br>The company still has a strong position in India's audio and wearables market. However, competition remains intense, with several Indian and global brands competing in similar price segments.​<br></p>

<h2>BoAt Unlisted Share Price: ₹852</h2><p>Back in 2022 and at the start of 2023, the shares were trading at about ₹1,000–1,100. Then the price started to climb because everyone thought an IPO was coming. <br><br>The shares reportedly reached around ₹1,807 in June 2025.<br><br>Now the price is at ₹852 which means the shares have dropped by more than 50% from that high point. <br>However, a sharp fall in price does not automatically mean that the shares are cheap.<br><br>Using FY25 consolidated EPS of around ₹4.07, the current price of ₹852 implies a P/E ratio of around 209x.<br><br>The valuation can become more reasonable if boAt is able to grow earnings strongly in the coming years. For that to happen, the company will need to focus on three things:<br><br>1.<strong> Revenue growth:</strong> The company has to go past the ₹3,000 crore revenue number.<br><br>2. <strong>Better margins:</strong> Higher operating margins will make the company more profitable.<br><br>3. <strong>Growth in profits:</strong> At the price people who invest are already hoping for big increases in earnings.<br><br>So the reason to invest now is more, about what might happen in the future than what is happening now.<br><br>Another important point is that unlisted share prices are not as transparent as listed market prices. Different dealers may quote different prices, and liquidity can be limited.<br><br>Therefore, investors should not look only at the fact that the price has fallen from ₹1,807 to ₹852. The valuation at ₹852 is more important than the percentage decline from the previous high.</p><h3>IPO Update</h3><p>Imagine Marketing has been working towards an IPO for several years.<br><br>The latest IPO plan is for an issue of up to ₹1,500 crore, comprising:<br></p><p><br></p><table class="se-table-size-100 se-table-layout-auto"><tbody><tr><td><div style="text-align: center"><strong>IPO Component</strong><br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center"><strong>Amount</strong><br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">Fresh Issue<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">Up to ₹500 crore<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">Offer for Sale<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">Up to ₹1,000 crore<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">Total Proposed Issue<br></div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">Up to ₹1,500 crore​<br></div></td></tr></tbody></table>

<p>​<br>The company has filed updated IPO documents. However, the final price band and listing date are still subject to the next stages of the IPO process.<br><br></p><p>The final RHP will be important because it will provide updated financial information and the final details of the offer.</p><h2>Key Risks</h2><p>Despite the strong brand and improved FY25 performance, several risks remain.</p><h3>1. Slow Revenue Growth</h3><p>Revenue has remained flat and is still below FY23 levels. The company needs to show that it can grow again.</p><h3>2. Thin Profit Margins</h3><p>The company returned to profit in FY25, but net margins remain relatively low. Any increase in discounts, marketing costs or competition could affect profitability.</p><h3>3. High Valuation</h3><p>At ₹852 per share, boAt is trading at around 209x FY25 earnings. This means a large part of the valuation depends on future profit growth.</p><h3>4. Unlisted Share Liquidity</h3><p>Unlisted shares are not as easy to sell as listed stocks. Prices can vary between dealers, and a buyer may not always be available at the expected price.</p><h3>5. IPO Uncertainty</h3><p>The IPO process has already taken longer than initially expected. The final valuation, price band and listing date are yet to be announced.</p><h2>Conclusion</h2><p>BoAt has a strong brand and FY25 showed a clear improvement in profitability. The company returned to profit, reduced debt, and improved its operating efficiency.</p><p><br>However, revenue growth remains weak, and the current price of ₹852 still implies a high P/E of around 209x based on FY25 earnings.</p><p><br>The stock may become attractive if BoAt can restart revenue growth and deliver strong profit growth.&nbsp;</p><p><br>Until then, investors should focus more on the valuation and future earnings potential rather than simply looking at the sharp fall from its earlier unlisted share price.​<br></p>

BoAt Unlisted Shares: Should You Invest Before the IPO?

<p style="text-align: justify">​<a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/sun-drops-energia-share-price/">Sun Drops Energia Limited</a> will be convening an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM No. 02/2026-27), as per the Notice issued on August 21, 2026, which will take place on Monday, September 14, 2026. The meeting will commence at 09:30 AM IST at the registered office of the company.<br><br><strong>Key Agenda Items for the EGM:</strong><br></p><ul><li><strong>Increase in Authorised Share Capital: </strong>Approval for increase in the Authorised Share Capital from INR 50,00,00,000 (comprising of 10,00,00,000 Equity Shares of INR 5 each) to INR 50,80,00,000 (comprising of 10,00,00,000 Equity Shares of INR 5 each and 16,00,000 Preference Shares of INR 5 each) by way of creation of 16,00,000 Preference Shares, together with amendment of Clause V of the Memorandum of Association.<br></li><li><strong>Acquisition of Target Company:</strong> Approval for the acquisition of up to 1,70,84,853 equity shares which are fully paid-up (upto 100% of equity share capital) of DEK and Mavericks Green Energy Limited at a price of INR 32.66 per equity share, aggregating to INR 55,80,44,927.<br></li><li><strong>Issue of CCPS on preferential basis: </strong>Approval for issuance and allotment of up to 15,89,781 Compulsorily Convertible Preference Shares (CCPS) of face value INR 5 each at an issue price of INR 351.02 per CCPS (inclusive of premium of INR 346.02 per CCPS) on preferential basis for consideration other than cash<br></li><li><strong>Terms and Conversion of CCPS: </strong>CCPS have a non-cumulative preferential dividend rate of 0.01%, and they shall be compulsorily converted to Equity Shares at the ratio of 1:1 during a period not exceeding 12 months from the date of allotment or submission of RHP to SEBI, whichever is earlier.</li></ul><p style="text-align: justify"><strong>EGM Logistics Information:</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify"><br></p><div style="margin-left: 0pt; text-align: justify"><table><tbody><tr><td><p style="line-height: 1.38;text-align: justify"><span style="font-size:15px;color:#000000;background-color:transparent"><strong>Detail</strong></span></p></td><td><p style="line-height: 1.38;text-align: justify"><span style="font-size:15px;color:#000000;background-color:transparent"><strong>Information</strong></span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="line-height: 1.38;text-align: justify"><span style="font-size:15px;color:#000000;background-color:transparent">EGM Date and Time</span></p></td><td><p style="line-height: 1.38;text-align: justify"><span style="font-size:15px;color:#000000;background-color:transparent">Monday, September 14, 2026, at 09:30 AM IST</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="line-height: 1.38;text-align: justify"><span style="font-size:15px;color:#000000;background-color:transparent">Venue</span></p></td><td><p style="line-height: 1.38;text-align: justify"><span style="font-size:15px;color:#000000;background-color:transparent">Registered Office: 'KP House', Near KP Circle, Opp. Ishwar Farm Junction BRTS, Canal Road, Bhatar, Surat-395017, Gujarat, India</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="line-height: 1.38;text-align: justify"><span style="font-size:15px;color:#000000;background-color:transparent">Notice Date</span></p></td><td><p style="line-height: 1.38;text-align: justify"><span style="font-size:15px;color:#000000;background-color:transparent">August 21, 2026</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="line-height: 1.38;text-align: justify"><span style="font-size:15px;color:#000000;background-color:transparent">Registered Valuer</span></p></td><td><p style="line-height: 1.38;text-align: justify"><span style="font-size:15px;color:#000000;background-color:transparent">Mr. Abhishek Chhajed, Registered Valuer (Reg. No. IBBI/RV/03/2020/13674)</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="line-height: 1.38;text-align: justify"><span style="font-size:15px;color:#000000;background-color:transparent">Proxy Submission Deadline</span></p></td><td><p style="line-height: 1.38;text-align: justify"><span style="font-size:15px;color:#000000;background-color:transparent">Duly completed Form MGT-11 must be deposited at least 48 hours prior to the meeting</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table></div>

Sun Drops Energia Limited – Notice of Extraordinary General Meeting

<p style="text-align: justify">A shell company under OYO's umbrella, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/oyo-share-price/">OYO</a> Financial and Technology Services, had barely anything on its books in March 2025: no hotels, no real revenue, just ₹2.5 crore in assets. A year later it had been renamed Sunday Proptech Limited and had grown into a company worth ₹7,117 crore in total assets, running hotels across the US, Dubai, the UK, and India, with 49 subsidiaries under it. OYO's ownership share dropped from nearly 100% to just 31% in that same window. This wasn't organic growth. It was a company built from scratch in twelve months through acquisitions, borrowing, and a major shareholder reshuffle.</p><h3>How the business actually works</h3><p style="text-align: justify">Most hotel companies pick a lane: either you own the real estate and collect rent, or you operate the hotel and take a management fee. Sunday Proptech is trying to do both at once, buying underperforming but well-located hotels, fixing them up, and running them directly so it captures both the property value and the operating profit.</p><p style="text-align: justify">It holds these hotels three different ways. Some are owned outright (mostly in the US, worth around ₹4,590 crore). Some are on long-term leases, which is a cheaper way to enter a market and is how it operates in Dubai and the UK. And some are managed on behalf of other owners, which needs no capital at all.</p><p style="text-align: justify">What's notable is what it chose not to build. It doesn't have its own hotel brand or booking technology. Instead it licenses brand names like Motel 6 and Studio 6 in the US from G6 Hospitality, and uses OYO's own brands (Sunday Hotels, Palette, Townhouse) in India and the Gulf. The entire cost of licensing all these brands for the year came to just ₹2.4 crore, a tiny fraction against a ₹7,117 crore asset base. The logic is that building brand recognition and tech from the ground up only pays off once you're operating at massive scale, so for now it's cheaper to rent that infrastructure.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify">Where the money is versus where the money comes from</h3><p style="text-align: justify">The clearest way to see the strategy is to compare where the assets sit against where the revenue is actually coming from.</p><p style="text-align: justify"><br></p><div style="text-align: justify"><table><thead><tr><th><div style="text-align: justify">Country</div></th><th><div>Non-current assets (₹ crore)</div></th><th><div>FY26 Revenue (₹ crore)</div></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><div>United States</div></td><td><div>4,604</div></td><td><div>46</div></td></tr><tr><td><div>Dubai (UAE)</div></td><td><div>929</div></td><td><div>179</div></td></tr><tr><td><div>United Kingdom</div></td><td><div>577</div></td><td><div>39</div></td></tr><tr><td><div>India</div></td><td><div>166</div></td><td><div>6</div></td></tr></tbody></table></div><p><br></p><p style="text-align: justify">The US holds nearly three-quarters of all assets but only produced about a sixth of total revenue. That's because most of the American hotels were bought late in the financial year and are still being renovated, so they haven't started earning yet. Dubai shows the opposite pattern: a smaller asset base but the biggest revenue contribution, because it runs mostly on leases that generate rental income right away without tying up large amounts of capital. India, despite being where OYO started and where most people know the brand from, barely registers here with just ₹6 crore in revenue.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify">The 38 hotel purchase and an accounting quirk worth understanding</h3><p style="text-align: justify">During the year, the company bought 38 hotel properties in the US for roughly ₹3,178 crore. Eight of them came from two sellers in November 2025, and the rest were picked up from various sellers before the year closed. All of these are being converted into the extended-stay format under the Motel 6 and Studio 6 brands.</p><p style="text-align: justify">Here's the part that needs a careful look. When a company buys a business, its auditors assess the fair value of everything acquired. In this case, the auditors valued the acquired property at ₹4,504 crore, well above the ₹3,178 crore actually paid. After subtracting a deferred tax liability of ₹278 crore, that leaves a gap of roughly ₹1,047 crore. Accounting rules call this a "bargain purchase gain," and management is framing it as proof they negotiated well and got more value than they paid for.</p><p style="text-align: justify">Three things are worth keeping in mind about that gain. First, it isn't cash. No money moved into the bank because of it; it's purely a valuation adjustment sitting in the capital reserve. Second, this single gain makes up about 78% of the company's entire net worth of ₹1,350 crore, meaning if you strip it out, the balance sheet looks a lot thinner. Third, the report itself notes that the purchase price allocation hasn't been finalized yet. These are provisional numbers based on management's own assessment, and while they don't expect big changes, nothing is locked in.</p><p style="text-align: justify">Also worth noting: those same 38 hotels only generated ₹44 crore in revenue since they were acquired, and actually posted a pre-tax loss of ₹28.6 crore. They've been bought, but they haven't been fixed yet.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify">Who's actually behind the company</h3><p style="text-align: justify">A year ago ownership was simple: OYO's parent, Oravel Stays, held basically all of it. That changed after the company issued new shares through a private placement, raised about ₹239 crore, and added a large batch of bonus shares. The ownership table now looks very different.</p><p style="text-align: justify"><br></p><div style="text-align: justify"><table><thead><tr><th><div style="text-align: justify">Shareholder</div></th><th><div>Stake</div></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><div>Astera Ventures Pvt Ltd (formerly Tattva Valuers)</div></td><td><div>35.71%</div></td></tr><tr><td><div>Oravel Stays Ltd (OYO)</div></td><td><div>31.09%</div></td></tr><tr><td><div>Pallavi Pradeep Kumar Jain</div></td><td><div>6.10%</div></td></tr><tr><td><div>InCred Wealth &amp; Investment Services</div></td><td><div>3.58%</div></td></tr><tr><td><div>Others</div></td><td><div>23.52%</div></td></tr></tbody></table></div><p><br></p><p style="text-align: justify">OYO never sold any shares, it simply got diluted as new shares were issued to others. But the effect was significant: the terms of these new share agreements meant OYO lost operational control of the company. It's no longer treated as the parent company in accounting terms and is now booked as a joint venture partner instead.</p><p style="text-align: justify">Two details stand out here. The new largest shareholder, Astera Ventures, was renamed from something called Tattva Valuers Private Limited around the same time all this was happening. And the annual report explicitly states the company has no identifiable promoter and is professionally managed, meaning the ultimate owner behind that biggest shareholder isn't disclosed anywhere in the filing.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify">The debt picture</h3><p style="text-align: justify">Borrowing exploded over the year. Total borrowings sit at ₹3,203 crore, and once you add lease obligations of ₹2,171 crore and other financial liabilities, then subtract the small amount of cash on hand, net debt comes to roughly ₹5,443 crore against equity of just ₹1,350 crore. That's a debt to equity ratio of about 4 times, up from just 0.34 times the year before.</p><p style="text-align: justify">The reported interest expense is a bit misleading too. Finance costs for the year came to ₹115 crore, but only ₹22 crore of that was actual interest on loans; most of it was interest tied to lease obligations. That's because the biggest loan facility, ₹1,850 crore from Citibank, was only drawn down eleven days before the financial year ended. On a full year basis, interest on the total borrowings at a typical rate of 9 to 10% would likely run north of ₹280 crore, meaning the real interest burden hasn't shown up in these numbers yet.</p><p style="text-align: justify">Most of the lending is secured directly against the American hotel portfolio, largely through Citibank, with a mix of other lenders including mezzanine financing, private placement notes, and some high interest loans from entities that are also shareholders in the company, like InCred and Astera Ventures. One of the lenders, RA Hospitality Holdings, is linked to OYO's founder.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify">The revenue dependency that stands out most</h3><p style="text-align: justify">This is probably the most important thing to understand about the company right now. Total revenue from operations was ₹269 crore, and rental income alone made up ₹223 crore of that, or 83% of the total.</p><p style="text-align: justify">Looking at the related party disclosures, nearly all of that rental income traces back to other OYO group entities: OYO's Dubai hotel management arm, its UK operating company, its vacation rentals business, and a few smaller OYO-linked entities. Adding those up gets you almost exactly to the ₹223 crore rental income figure. The geographic pattern matches too: revenue from Dubai, the UK, and India lines up closely with payments from OYO group companies in those same markets.</p><p style="text-align: justify">In other words, essentially all of the rental income is coming from within the OYO ecosystem itself. The only revenue that comes from genuinely outside parties is the roughly ₹46 crore earned from the American hotels' actual guest bookings.</p><p style="text-align: justify">Management describes the relationship with OYO as a partnership rather than a dependency. That's fair when it comes to brand licensing, which only costs ₹2.4 crore. But when 83% of total revenue comes from the same corporate family, and all these related party deals are disclosed as being done at arm's length with a clean, unqualified audit report, the word "independent" is carrying a lot of weight.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify">A handful of other things worth flagging</h3><p style="text-align: justify">The company paid out a dividend this year, ₹3 crore as an interim payment and another ₹1.5 crore proposed as a final payment, despite carrying over ₹3,200 crore in debt in its very first year of operating at this scale. Management calls this a signal of confidence; others might see it as cash that could have gone toward interest payments instead.</p><p style="text-align: justify">The company doesn't even have a website, a detail the annual report mentions directly when explaining why certain filings weren't uploaded online.</p><p style="text-align: justify">Governance is thin for a company this size. The board has only three non-executive directors, no managing director, and no whole-time director, despite overseeing 49 subsidiaries spread across four countries. Both the CFO and company secretary were only appointed in February 2026, just two months before the financial year closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify">And while the lease-heavy approach in Dubai and the UK is genuinely capital efficient since it doesn't require buying property outright, it isn't risk free either. Those ₹2,171 crore in lease obligations are fixed, multi-year commitments. Rent doesn't go down if a hotel's occupancy drops, and some of these lease contracts even come with financial covenants, essentially behaving the way a lender's loan conditions would.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify">The bottom line</h3><p style="text-align: justify">What's been built here is a highly leveraged bet on turning around budget hotels in America, financed largely through foreign debt, run by a team with deep OYO ties, and currently kept afloat by rental income from OYO's own group companies. It's a coherent strategy, and the price paid for the hotel portfolio does appear to have been a good deal on paper.</p><p style="text-align: justify">But the numbers from this first year describe a company that's just getting started, not one that has proven its model works. The reported profit of ₹13.5 crore sits almost entirely on top of a ₹1,047 crore non-cash accounting gain that hasn't even been finalized yet. The real interest cost from all that new borrowing hasn't fully hit the books. The newly acquired American hotels are currently losing money. And operating cash flow of just ₹32 crore is a fairly thin cushion under net debt of ₹5,443 crore.</p><p style="text-align: justify">The year ahead is where this story will really get tested, once the full interest burden lands, once the Motel 6 conversions need to actually start filling rooms, and once it becomes clear whether revenue from outside the OYO family can grow faster than the debt taken on to build all this.</p>

38 Hotels in 12 Months: The OYO Spin-Off's Massive US Expansion

<p><br>BigBasket has always been one of the hottest names in India’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/pre-ipo/">pre-IPO market</a>, thanks to the Tata brand and its leadership in online grocery shopping. But the past two years have really put the company's story through the wringer. Now that the losses are widening drastically in FY26, and no official IPO date is announced, the new question on the minds of any investor in BigBasket stock is "What exactly am I getting here?"</p><h2>The Financials Have Gotten Worse, Not Better</h2><p>The consumer division of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/bigbasket/">BigBasket</a> (Innovative Retail Concepts) saw its revenues at Rs 8,223 crore in FY26 as compared to Rs 7,634 crore in FY25, which is an increase of 7.7%. At first glance, this seems to be adequate growth for any business in such a fiercely competitive market. However, it is the number below that poses a bigger worry as the net loss expanded 66% to Rs 3,073 crore from Rs 1,850 crore in FY25.<br><br></p><table class="se-table-size-100 se-table-layout-auto"><tbody><tr><td><p style="line-height: 1;text-align: center"><strong><span style="background-color: transparent">Metric (Rs Crore)</span></strong></p></td><td><div><strong>FY25</strong><br></div></td><td><div><strong>FY26</strong><br></div></td><td><div><strong>Change (y-o-y)</strong><br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div>B2C Revenue (Innovative Retail Concepts)<br></div></td><td><div>7,634<br></div></td><td><div>8,223<br></div></td><td><div>+7.7%<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div>B2C Net Loss<br></div></td><td><div>(1,850)<br></div></td><td><div>(3,073)<br></div></td><td><div>+66% wider<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div>Combined Revenue (incl. backend supply)<br></div></td><td><div>~9,700<br></div></td><td><div>10,521<br></div></td><td><div>—<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div>Combined Net Loss<br></div></td><td><div>~2,300<br></div></td><td><div>3,175<br></div></td><td><div>wider<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div>Tata Digital Consolidated Loss<br></div></td><td><div>4,610<br></div></td><td><div>4,974<br></div></td><td><div>+7.9%<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div>Tata Digital Revenue<br></div></td><td><div>~32,150<br></div></td><td><div>35,990<br></div></td><td><div>+11.9%​<br></div></td></tr></tbody></table>

<p><br>The fact that losses are rising at four times the rate of revenue growth for BigBasket is no rounding error; it's the first and most fundamental thing that an investor will have to account for before any other factor. What's more, this problem isn't just unique to BigBasket; Tata Sons has so far invested more than Rs 22,000 crore in Tata Digital as a whole. This shows that there has been consistent funding for the business over the years, but no profits.</p><h2>Quick Commerce Forced a Pivot BigBasket Hasn't Fully Won</h2><p>The root cause is straightforward: India's grocery-delivery market swung hard toward 10–20 minute quick commerce, and BigBasket had to follow. Roughly 80% of its revenue now comes through this format via BB Now, competing against entrenched, heavily funded rivals.<br><br></p><table class="se-table-size-100 se-table-layout-auto"><tbody><tr><td><div style="text-align: center"><strong>Platform</strong><br></div></td><td><div><strong>Estimated Market Share (2026)</strong><br></div></td><td><div><strong>Parent/Backing</strong><br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div>​<a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/blinkit-blink-commerce-private-limited/">Blinkit</a>​<br></div></td><td><div>~46–50%<br></div></td><td><div>Eternal (Zomato)<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div>​<a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/swiggy-share-price/">Swiggy</a> Instamart<br></div></td><td><div>~20–25%<br></div></td><td><div>Swiggy<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div>​<a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/zepto-kiranakart-technologies-pvt-ltd/">Zepto</a>​<br></div></td><td><div>~20–25%<br></div></td><td><div>Independently funded, IPO-bound<br></div></td></tr><tr><td><div>BigBasket (BB Now)<br></div></td><td><div>~5–7%<br></div></td><td><div>Tata Digital​<br></div></td></tr></tbody></table>

<p><strong><br>Source: </strong>Datum Intelligence/Reuters (Jan 2026), BofA Securities, Bernstein estimates<br><br>The rapid commerce space in India was valued at around $11.5 billion (Rs 95,500 crore) at the end of 2025, according to Reuters on the basis of information from Datum Intelligence. It is expanding at an annual growth rate of more than 75%. The construction of the dark stores required for competition is very capital-intensive, and Bigbasket, with only a single-digit market share, is still far behind in the race for fourth place. The company had a shake-up of its leadership in June 2026 when its co-founder Hari Menon was replaced by Amit Nanda.</p><h2>IPO Plans Exist, But the Timeline Keeps Moving</h2><p>The firm has announced an IPO in the range of Rs 12,000 – Rs 15,000 crores for 2026. The company is also planning to expand to 70 cities from the current 35 cities in its quick commerce model. This comes on the heels of the company’s guidance in December 2022 by its CFO, Vipul Parekh, for a listing in 2025, which has since been delayed. Regardless of any of these numbers, it is undeniable that mounting losses will make it tougher to claim a listing timeline, considering how fast Indian IPO windows open and close for loss-making consumer internet companies. Consider any number on the listing date indicative until the DRHP filing is made.<br></p>

<h3><strong>Key Takeaways</strong></h3><p>​<strong>1. Losses are widening, not narrowing:&nbsp;</strong>FY26 B2C net loss grew 66% y-o-y even as revenue grew only 7.7%.<br><br>​<strong>2. Tata backing offers a credibility floor,&nbsp;</strong>but Rs 22,000+ crore in cumulative funding without a profitability turnaround is a real red flag, not just a comfort factor.<br><br>​<strong>3. BB Now holds only ~5–7% of the quick commerce market,&nbsp;</strong>trailing Blinkit, Instamart, and Zepto by a wide margin.<br><br>​<strong>4. IPO guidance has already slipped once&nbsp;</strong>(from a 2025 target to 2026-plus), and no DRHP has been filed yet.<br><br>​<strong>5. Unlisted share pricing is illiquid and inconsistent&nbsp;</strong>across platforms — treat any single quoted price with caution.<br><br>The credibility of Tata and the massive potential of India’s online grocery market are very real positives for any investor, but today's valuation has to be taken in light of a company that is losing money at an increasingly alarming rate, unchanged market share numbers, and ever-delaying IPO plans. It's not a stock to simply buy because of the brand recognition; its losses and position in the market need to be considered as much as its growth potential.<br></p>

BigBasket Unlisted Shares: Is It Still a Good Buy?

<p style="text-align: justify">​<a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/india-exposition-mart-ltd/">India Exposition Mart Limited</a> (IEML) operates a large exhibition and convention facility in Greater Noida, built across 57 acres. Its core asset comprises 17 exhibition halls, around 88,509 sq. m. of indoor space and another 78,511 sq. m. of outdoor space. The company monetizes this single physical complex through multiple complementary businesses, making it more than a conventional venue-rental company.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify"><strong>Six revenue engines</strong></h3><p style="text-align: justify">IEML generates revenue through third-party events, hospitality, its own exhibitions, managed events, maintenance services and its B2B digital platform, ExpoBazaar. Third-party events remain the backbone, contributing 56.44% of FY26 revenue. The company leases exhibition space to organizers and additionally earns from services such as security, housekeeping, food and beverages, medical facilities and IT support. Its recurring event calendar also provides a degree of revenue visibility.</p><p style="text-align: justify"><br></p><table><thead><tr><td><p style="text-align: justify">Revenue stream</p></td><td><p>FY26 Revenue (₹ cr)</p></td><td><p>Share</p></td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p>Third-Party Events</p></td><td><p>164.03</p></td><td><p>56.44%</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>Hotels &amp; Hospitality</p></td><td><p>39.39</p></td><td><p>13.55%</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>Own IPs</p></td><td><p>31.93</p></td><td><p>10.99%</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>Managed Events</p></td><td><p>28.41</p></td><td><p>9.77%</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>Maintenance Services</p></td><td><p>13.48</p></td><td><p>4.64%</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>Export Supply Chain</p></td><td><p>11.40</p></td><td><p>3.92%</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>Others</p></td><td><p>1.99</p></td><td><p>0.69%</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>Total</p></td><td><p>290.63</p></td><td><p>100%</p></td></tr></tbody></table><p><br></p><p style="text-align: justify">The model is attractive because IEML can extract additional value from the same underlying asset. Its 136-room ExpoInn hotel, leased and managed hospitality properties, cafés, permanent showrooms and ExpoBazaar platform provide revenue even when exhibitions are not taking place.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify"><strong>Revenue growth is strong, but event volumes are falling</strong></h3><p style="text-align: justify">Revenue increased from ₹194.73 crore in FY24 to ₹290.63 crore in FY26, implying a strong growth trajectory. However, the number of events declined from 61 to 44 over the same period.</p><p style="text-align: justify">​</p><table><thead><tr><td><p>Metric</p></td><td><p>FY24</p></td><td><p>FY25</p></td><td><p>FY26</p></td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p>Revenue from operations (₹ cr)</p></td><td><p>194.73</p></td><td><p>241.15</p></td><td><p>290.63</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>Total events</p></td><td><p>61</p></td><td><p>51</p></td><td><p>44</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>EBITDA (₹ cr)</p></td><td><p>55.10</p></td><td><p>77.11</p></td><td><p>65.74</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>EBITDA margin</p></td><td><p>28.29%</p></td><td><p>31.98%</p></td><td><p>22.62%</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>PAT (₹ cr)</p></td><td><p>23.31</p></td><td><p>38.64</p></td><td><p>31.16</p></td></tr></tbody></table><p><br></p><p style="text-align: justify">The divergence between revenue and event count suggests that IEML is generating more revenue per event rather than simply hosting more events. That can be positive if larger exhibitions are replacing smaller ones, but it also highlights a structural limitation: the company has a finite number of halls and operating days. Future growth therefore has to come from higher revenue per event or from businesses beyond its core venue.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify"><strong>FY26 exposes the cost of expansion</strong></h3><p style="text-align: justify">The biggest concern is profitability. Revenue grew 20.52% in FY26, but PAT declined 19.4%, while EBITDA margin fell from 31.98% to 22.62%. The primary reason was a sharp increase in other expenses, particularly exhibition-related costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify">Fairs and exhibition expenses rose 66.93% to ₹102.03 crore. Setup costs increased significantly because FY26 included three IHGF editions compared with one in FY25. This partly reflects a calendar shift rather than a permanent increase in underlying activity.</p><p style="text-align: justify">A second issue was licence fees. These jumped from ₹0.16 crore to ₹16.35 crore as IEML held five events at external venues versus one previously. This is strategically important: when an event is held at IEML's own venue, the company benefits from owning the infrastructure; when it operates elsewhere, it must pay another venue owner.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify"><strong>Balance sheet and cash flow remain strengths</strong></h3><p style="text-align: justify">Despite the margin pressure, the balance sheet is relatively conservative. Borrowings declined from ₹23.27 crore in FY24 to just ₹0.60 crore in FY26. Meanwhile, capital work-in-progress rose sharply to ₹56.27 crore, indicating investment in additional capacity. Trade receivables also increased 55% to ₹47.22 crore, faster than revenue growth.</p><p style="text-align: justify">Cash generation provides another positive signal. Operating cash flow increased from ₹38.56 crore to ₹52.84 crore in FY26 even as reported profit declined. However, capex rose dramatically to ₹62.28 crore, meaning investment requirements are beginning to absorb a significant portion of internally generated cash.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify"><strong>Where does the IPO money goes?</strong></h3><p style="text-align: justify">The fresh issue is primarily intended to upgrade the existing facility, including air-handling units, chillers, cooling towers, lifts and escalators, while also renovating Halls 4 and 6 and developing Hall 18. A major portion of the expenditure is scheduled for FY29.</p><p style="text-align: justify">Beyond the existing venue, management is pursuing an asset-light expansion strategy. This includes a proposed 35% stake in a Mohali convention-center SPV, expansion of its own event IPs, scaling ExpoBazaar and adding hospitality properties. However, several of these initiatives remain early-stage and some hotel concepts currently exist only as trademarks.</p><h3 style="text-align: justify"><strong>Investment takeaway</strong></h3><p style="text-align: justify">IEML offers exposure to India's expanding MICE ecosystem, but the investment case is more nuanced than simply betting on exhibition-industry growth. The company has a strong physical asset, multiple monetization channels, low leverage and healthy operating cash generation. At the same time, its expansion strategy is gradually moving away from its highest-margin advantage owning the venue.</p><p style="text-align: justify"><br></p><table><thead><tr><td><p style="text-align: justify">Key positive</p></td><td><p>Key concern</p></td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p>Dominant privately owned exhibition asset</p></td><td><p>Heavy dependence on one venue</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>Multiple revenue streams</p></td><td><p>Limited physical capacity</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>Very low debt</p></td><td><p>EBITDA margin compression</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>Strong operating cash flow</p></td><td><p>Rising capex requirements</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>Growing hospitality business</p></td><td><p>Increasing off-campus event costs</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>ExpoBazaar provides diversification</p></td><td><p>Several new initiatives remain unproven</p></td></tr></tbody></table><p><br></p><p style="text-align: justify">The central question for investors is therefore not whether IEML can grow revenue, it clearly can but whether it can expand beyond its physical venue without permanently sacrificing the attractive economics of its core business. FY26 provides the first warning sign that growth may increasingly require accepting lower margins in exchange for a larger addressable market.</p>

Space for Rent, Shares for Sale: Hall Rental Firm Goes Public

<p style="text-align: justify">India's largest stock exchange has crossed a critical milestone in its nearly decade-long path to a public listing. The <a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/national-stock-exchange/">National Stock Exchange</a> has received a No-Objection Certificate from SEBI, confirmed by NSE CEO Ashishkumar Chauhan, clearing the way for its Draft Red Herring Prospectus to move through final regulatory review.</p><p style="text-align: justify"><strong>The Decade-Long Road</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify">NSE's IPO journey has been anything but straightforward. The exchange first filed its draft prospectus back in December 2016, but the process stalled for years amid regulatory scrutiny over preferential access to its algorithmic trading platform — the co-location controversy that would go on to define nearly a decade of delay. Multiple attempts to secure SEBI's no-objection certificate followed — in 2019, twice in 2020, and again in 2024 — each running into unresolved governance concerns.</p><p style="text-align: justify">The breakthrough came this year. SEBI decoupled the ongoing co-location settlement from the IPO approval process, allowing NSE to move forward on its listing while the legacy matter was resolved in parallel. NSE has since fully settled the case, paying a total of ₹1,491.21 crore to close out the last major legal overhang on the exchange.</p><p style="text-align: justify"><strong>Where Things Stand Today</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify">NSE filed its DRHP with SEBI on June 17, 2026, and global investor roadshows began a month later across financial hubs including Boston, New York, San Francisco, London, Singapore, and Hong Kong, with roughly 120 large institutional investors engaged — including BlackRock, Capital Group, GQG Partners, Janus Henderson, and Allspring Global Investments. NSE has appointed 20 investment banks to manage the issue, among them Kotak Mahindra Capital, JM Financial, Morgan Stanley, HSBC, and Citigroup.</p><p style="text-align: justify">While the NOC is in hand, SEBI's final DRHP approval is still awaited — reportedly expected within the next two weeks. The approval timeline shifted after SBI Capital Markets was added to the list of selling shareholders, a change that triggered a fresh 21-day public feedback period on the offer documents.</p><p style="text-align: justify">The issue itself is structured entirely as an Offer for Sale — up to 14.89 crore shares, roughly 6% of NSE's paid-up equity, sold by existing shareholders. As an OFS, proceeds go to the selling shareholders rather than to NSE, and the share count stays fixed, so there is no dilution.</p><p style="text-align: justify"><strong>The Valuation Question</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify">NSE is reportedly targeting a valuation of ₹5.2–5.3 lakh crore, with a potential price band of ₹2,100–2,300 per share. At the upper end, a 6% stake sale could raise close to ₹31,500 crore — which would make this India's largest-ever IPO, surpassing Hyundai Motor India's ₹27,870 crore issue.</p><p style="text-align: justify">Working off NSE's reported PAT of ₹10,302 Cr and 247.5 crore outstanding shares, here's how the implied valuation moves across a range of P/E multiples:</p><div style="text-align: justify"><table><thead><tr><th><div style="text-align: center">P/E Multiple</div></th><th><div style="text-align: center">Market Capitalisation (₹ Lakh Cr)</div></th><th><div style="text-align: center">Implied Price per Share (₹)</div></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">35x</div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">3.6</div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">1,457</div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">40x</div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">4.1</div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">1,666</div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">45x</div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">4.6</div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">1,874</div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">50x</div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">5.2</div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">2,082</div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">55x</div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">5.7</div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">2,290</div></td></tr><tr><td><div style="text-align: center">60x</div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">6.2</div></td><td><div style="text-align: center">2,498</div></td></tr></tbody></table></div><p style="text-align: justify">Since the issue is entirely an OFS, the share count stays fixed, making implied per-share values directly comparable across the multiple range. Notably, the reported target price band of ₹2,100–2,300 sits right around the 50x–55x mark — implying the market is pricing NSE close to BSE's current P/E of roughly 50x, rather than at a premium or discount to India's only other listed exchange.</p><p style="text-align: justify"><strong>The Bigger Picture</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify">At its targeted valuation, NSE would rank around 6th globally among listed exchange operators by market value — a striking marker for an institution that spent nine years working through a single regulatory approval. With the DRHP decision now the final gate before pricing, the coming two weeks will determine whether NSE's September listing timeline holds.</p>

A Historic Milestone: NSE Receives SEBI's No-Objection Certificate for Its IPO

<p><strong>Financial Performance (FY26 Numbers):<br></strong><br>The total revenue of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.planify.in/research-report/sun-drops-energia-share-price/">Sun Drops Energia Limited</a> was at ₹586.0 crore in FY26, registering a healthy increase of around 58.8% YoY as compared to ₹369.0 crore in FY25 (and a massive exponential growth from ₹4.79 crore in FY22). Turnkey EPC for CPP and utility-scale commercial solar make up the majority of revenue, along with growing annuity-based Independent Power Producers (IPP). The Net Profit (PAT) is ₹97.0 crore with Net Profit Margin at 16.55%, witnessing an increase of ~89.1% YoY from ₹51.3 crore in FY25. With the help of its increasing order book and IPO, the valuation of unlisted equity of Sun Drops Energia was about ₹1,995 crore (ranging from ₹230 per share).<br><br><strong>Operational Metrics:<br></strong><br>The company Sun Drops Energia works on an integrated "IPP + CPP Turnkey EPC" business model which enables the company to cover the entire life cycle of projects starting from acquisition of land, engineering and power evacuation infrastructure to procurement, commissioning and maintenance. The company has a clean and healthy balance sheet structure with the Debt to Equity ratio of only 0.16x for FY25, which signifies low leverage and absence of dependence on external financing even with fast pace of asset creation. Sound financial control is evident with the help of an Interest Coverage ratio of 15.68x (FY25) and a Current ratio of 3.36x (FY25), thereby leaving sufficient margin for working capital. The operating leverage is a result of standard engineering templates and centralized module procurement in the KP group environment.<br><br><strong>Key Project Executions &amp; Order Book:<br></strong><br>It has developed a solid execution history in the areas of utility-scale solar and industrial microgrids, which entails developing and commissioning several interconnected grid-scale solar projects in high-irradiance belts of Gujarat and Maharashtra states under the framework of the Distributed Renewable Energy Bilateral Purchase (DREBP). It has quickly established itself as one of the major market leaders in the storage category by winning 565 MW / 1,130 MWh BESS standalone projects from Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (GUVNL), which include 445 MW / 890 MWh project award and 120 MW / 240 MWh BESS Purchase Agreement (BESPA). Abroad, Sun Drops is developing solar and battery energy storage solution with the Fabtech Group and F+ Healthcare Technologies in UAE.<br><br><strong>Strategic Developments &amp; Outlook:<br></strong><br>Sun Drops Energia is an incorporated firm established in Surat, Gujarat, in May 2019 and serving as one of the major subsidiaries of KPI Green Energy Limited. Sun Drops Energia is specially selected to act as the dedicated arm of the KP Group to develop utility BESS and clean energy hybrid systems. Currently, the firm is gearing up to go for its own independent Initial Public Offering (IPO) in FY27. Given that India is looking at 500 GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030 and the mandatory inclusion of RTC renewable energy, Sun Drops Energia is one of the early players in the utility-scale BESS space.<br><br></p>

Sun Drops Energia: FY26 Financial Performance, BESS Expansion & IPO Outlook

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